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THE TRANSITION TO AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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A DISSERTATION

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I. INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM STATED.—SCOPE OF CRITICISM.—ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF UTILITARIANISM.—LIMITATIONS OF UTILITARIANISM.—CRITICISM OF CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS.—THE NEW VIEWPOINT.—CONSEQUENT REVISION OF VALUES.—PLAN OF TREATMENT

So much has been written concerning the evils of individualism and the mistakes of the hedonistic psychology and utilitarian ethics, without suggesting a satisfactory means of curing these evils or correcting these mistakes, that one is forced to believe that something is wrong with the method of attack. One reason for this failure may be that the significance of utilitarianism as a stage in the development of social theory has not yet been rightly comprehended and that we do not adequately foresee what should be the next step in our social philosophy and policy. This study is an attempt, (1) to throw utilitarianism into perspective with the wider social forces and with the philosophical and psychological theory of its time and our time; (2) to show that the main current of present-day social theory, and likewise of ethical theory so far as it is social rather than theological and absolutistic in character, is largely an outgrowth of utilitarianism, or at least may be grouped in close connection with it; (3) to argue that we cannot escape the limitations imposed by a utilitarian ethics and by a hedonistic psychology upon our social policy until we reconstruct our system of social values, until we abandon the individual as the measure of all things social, and fix upon the group, even the widest conceivable group possessing solidarity, as the unity which lives, acts, and progresses or deteriorates. Such a change in emphasis obviously involves a reconstruction of our current psychology and ethics; for these two sciences as now written are essentially individualistic, and hence impotent so far as contribution to a constructive sociology and social policy is concerned.

Only an outline of the argument can be presented within the present limits, but it can be stated clearly and consistently enough, it is hoped, to make a point of departure, as well as furnish a basis for criticism. The second and third chapters of the study, on "The Neural Correlate of Feeling" and "The Cause of the Act," have been included, because the influence of feeling upon social activity has been and yet is a central problem in the development of social and ethical theory, though the relationship has been but unsatisfactorily worked out. In England it has been an academic problem since the time of Hobbes.¹ This problem came particularly to the fore among the utilitarians and, though somewhat obscured and below the surface, has by no means been wanting to the neo- and idealistic utilitarians and the other modern ethical individualists who would disclaim utilitarian parentage or connection. It has also, as a problem, divided the attention of the socialistic writers of the nineteenth century, who, quite conceivably, were not able to throw off the prevailing psychology and ethics of their time; though they were checks upon, and largely in contradiction with, their social policy. The greater portion of the critical parts of this study deals with the utilitarians and their successors and predecessors, because they have been the center of modern English and American social policy and social and ethical theory.² Short excursions are made into related fields to

¹ Cf. Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, 163.

² In Germany there has been a different theoretical basis, that of a state philosophy, which was at the same time essentially a moral philosophy (*Rechtsphilosophie*). Cf. Small, *The Cameralists*. The hedonistic and utilitarian philosophies, however, did enter Germany, largely from the English of Hobbes, Locke, and Hume and their successors, perhaps mainly by way of Helvetius and Rousseau and their contemporaries, through Schiller, Goethe, Fichte, Lotze, and others. Professor Small has also found indications of German contact in the eighteenth century with Hume and his contemporaries. In France, Helvetius took much from Hobbes, while the intellectual connections of Rousseau with Locke are well known. The main current of social theory and policy in France, because of the failure consistently to carry out early democratic declarations, did not get beyond this early hedonism over into the English phase of utilitarianism of the first half of the nineteenth century, except in a partial degree in some of the socialists of whom Fourier and Proudhon are types. The individualism and hedonism of French socialism of

give a completer account of the process of thought. No attempt will be made, however, to cover the whole ground, or to give a history of the development of utilitarian ethics. Space permits only the selection of types.

Utilitarianism, as has been pointed out,³ was with Bentham and his coworkers and immediate followers mainly a movement in social policy. It was essentially a practical reform movement which in the first half of the nineteenth century accomplished great political results in England by way of insisting upon equal privileges and democratic recognition for the masses.⁴ But all movements of social policy, if they do not grow directly out of a social philosophy—which perhaps can never wholly account for them—must create a social philosophy to justify their existence and interpret their aims to the masses of the people of all degrees. Utilitarianism could choose as the psychological bases of its philosophy either the intuitionism of the church philosophy, or the empirical hedonism of the free lances, coming down through Hobbes,

the nineteenth century stands out in strong contrast with the socialism of Rodbertus, Marx, and Engels in Germany, though there was an undercurrent of hedonistic, "utilitarian," and even anarchistic socialism in Germany, as in the case of Weitling, Lassalle, and others. The two types of socialism can also be distinguished in England, though its hedonistic and utilitarian affiliations were predominant there, as in Morris, Bax, Ruskin, and others, mainly because there was no distinct *Rechtsphilosophie*, grown out of a traditional governmental and social policy (*Cameralism*), as in Germany. The intuitionistic and theological line of thought held somewhat of this latter relation in England, though even it was individualistic rather than social or paternalistic in its viewpoint. Cf. Small, *The Cameralists*; Sidgwick, *History of Ethics* (3d ed.), chap. iv; Helvetius, *De l'esprit*, discours iii, esp. pp. 292, 324, 325 (ed. Paris, 1758); Hobbes, *Leviathan* (ed. Molesworth), 40 ff.; Büsch, *Geldumlauf*, Introduction, *et passim*; Kirkup, *History of Socialism*; Ely, *Modern French and German Socialism*; Spargo, *Socialism*, chap. ii; Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, (3d ed.), II; Wright, *The Ethical Significance of Pleasure, Feeling, and Happiness in Modern Non-Hedonistic Systems*.

³ Cf. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, 287; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 361; Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, 236 ff.; Mill, "Bentham," *Dissertations and Discussions*, I, 355 ff.

⁴ Bentham's two leading democratic principles were: The "greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question," and Everyone to count for one, and only for one. Cf. *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, chap. i, sec. 1, note.

Locke, Hume, Helvetius, Hartley, and others.⁵ Intuitionism was aristocratic, just as the church was generally opposed to social reforms. So the democratic-individualistic hedonism of the free thinkers came to be the basis of the utilitarian social policy just as it had earlier been that of the "liberty, equality, fraternity" philosophy of democracy in France and America. In fact, utilitarianism, in common with the democratic philosophy of the time, was a more or less conscious demand that each individual should be given a share in the egoistic and hedonic satisfactions which the social system afforded.

Most thinkers of the present regard the doctrines of utilitarianism as put forth by Bentham and his immediate followers, like the doctrines of democracy of Rousseau and Schiller and their followers, as overthrown. But the spirit of utilitarianism still lives and corrupts our social philosophy and policy. Important as were its earlier services, it now exerts an unsalutary influence in a democratic era, because it is essentially individualistic; because it aims primarily at democratic egoistic satisfaction rather than at democratic social conservation; because it is, despite its emphasis upon a democratic distribution of privilege and satisfaction, destructive rather than constructive. Its influence is still manifest in the reigning social theory and policy. And a more productive and long-sighted social policy and theory cannot be substituted so long as we retain our present individualistic psychology and ethics as their bases.

At the present time psychology is essentially solipsistic. As a science it recognizes only conscious processes,⁶ and centers

⁵ Cf. Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, 163, 204, 224, 236 ff.; Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. IV; Helvetius, *op. cit.*; Hartley, *Man*; Stephen, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, II, 80 ff.; Martineau, *op. cit.*, Part II, Bk. II, branch i.

⁶ Cf. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 3, 15; also *Physiological Psychology*, 1, 2. McDougall, though he first made this criticism, has not pointed out the most effective way in which a new psychology can be written. He lays too much stress upon a theory of the instincts and emotions, which he thereby raises almost to the rank of entities. The more fruitful line of development, it would seem, is in the direction of the study of the cortex and the lower nervous system as a mechanism, i.e., of conduct, in order to get

its treatment about a highly sophisticated and unreal self,⁷ which actually functions only in the most limited sphere of social activity. The significance of the work of the students of "abnormal" psychology and of the psychology of "suggestion" and physiological and comparative psychology has not been apprehended by the orthodox psychologists as yet. They have not taken over these data into their conventional textbooks. When they do so these treatises will be revolutionized, and the self, the socius, the individual, will be defined in such terms that the sociologist will recognize it. The solipsistic nature of this self will disappear and the self will come to be viewed as a factor subject to control in an objective social situation.⁸ Ethics also is individualistic in its evaluations, limiting the definition of moral activity to include only the field

at the nature and functioning of all types of activity processes, conscious and unconscious. At all events this would prevent us from making of consciousness a self-sufficient entity, instead of a means to adjustment to nature, as Professor Judd has done. Cf. "The Evolution of Consciousness," *Psychological Review* (March, 1910), 91 ff. For definitions of psychology bearing out the assertion in the text, see James, *Psychology*, I, 1; Sully, *The Human Mind*, I, 1; Wundt, *Outlines of Psy.* (tr. Judd), 23; Titchener, *Outlines of Psy.*, 6; Stout, *Manual of Psy.*, 4; Thorndike, *Elements of Psy.*, 1; Höffding, *Outlines of Psy.* (tr. Lowndes), 1; Angell, *Psychology*, 1; Baldwin, *Handbook of Psy.* (S. and I.), 8; etc.

⁷ For definitions and descriptions of this solipsistic self, see Baldwin, *op. cit.* (S. and I.), 67, (F. and W.), 170; Angell, *Psy.*, 396; Höffding, *op. cit.*, 136; Thilly, *Philos. Rev.*, XIX, 32; Stout, *op. cit.*, 517; Titchener, *op. cit.*, 301; Wundt, *op. cit.*, 242; James, *op. cit.*, 291, 293, 301; Sully, *op. cit.*, 481; etc.

⁸ G. H. Mead, *Journal of Phil., Psy. and Sci. Methods* (Mar. 31, 1910), 174, has attempted to remove this solipsistic character of the self of psychology by insisting upon an initially social individual (a conception which, in some form or other, goes back at least as far as the Greek philosophers, and to Adam Smith and his contemporaries among the moderns), stating the matter, however, from the standpoint of consciousness alone and thus from the subjectivistic standpoint of the conventional psychologist. In the same article he rejects the idea that psychology should accept the objective definition of the social object or socius which the social sciences offer. However, the psychologists of the unconscious and relatively unconscious processes and the social psychologists, dealing with the same material, are undermining the artificial and conventional psychology of the highly conscious processes, and will assist in securing the adoption of the objective and social viewpoint in treating of neural and activity processes, whether conscious or unconscious.

of volition, that is, of conscious choice.⁹ This is the old limitation which justified retributive punishment, and is wholly apart from the spirit of the most enlightened social practice of the present. Manifestly we need an ethics which will take account of the act, whether consciously or unconsciously performed, in relation to both its remote and immediate social results. In such an ethics "intention," that is, consciousness of one's tendency to act in a certain direction, will figure only as an aid to prevention. The act will be judged morally, that is, with reference to its social meaning, and treated constructively, on the basis of its discoverable causes. Consciousness will not figure as an entity or absolute in this causation, as it does in present ethical theory, but merely as one of the most obvious and effective points at which, by enlisting the additional asset of the individual's attention, we can begin to work more successfully preventively and reformatively and educationally.¹⁰ This is to say that conduct will be judged objectively, when it is judged scientifically and socially.¹¹

Our present-day psychology and ethics then are essentially of the individualistic type which furnished the basis of the old utilitarian and pseudo-democratic theory. So long as we

⁹ Cf. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, 201, 202 ff., 250, as a most recent example. Professor Dewey is responsible for these passages.

¹⁰ This is not to say, of course, that it is not of the greatest importance to bring as many of his activities as possible into the consciousness of the individual as a means to social control. It is rather a plea for the recognition of the fact that most of our activities are and always must be on a more or less unconscious and habitual basis, and hence of the necessity for a psychology which will make provision for the analysis and control of these activities. Professor Judd, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 88, 89, has defended the limitation of psychology to the field of consciousness. He appears not to have understood the point at issue. McDougall's demand, which he so strongly criticizes (pp. 88, 89), and the one made here, are that psychologists broaden their subject so as to afford a method for bringing all activities directly or indirectly under either individual or social (collectivistic) conscious control.

¹¹ Cf. an excellent paper by Professor Ellwood, "The Sociological Basis of Ethics," *International Journal of Ethics* (April, 1910), 314 ff. Professor Ellwood argues here in a general way for an objective and sociological basis for ethics, as does Professor Small, *General Sociology*, 33 ff., and Part V, and elsewhere. It is doubtful, however, if either has seen all the implications of limiting the scope of moral activity to the field of consciousness and volition.

retain them they will hinder the development of a consistent social theory which can be used—as a means of justification and communication—for the basis of a constructive and creative social policy. But if we rid ourselves of them, evidently it must be accomplished by means of bringing a new viewpoint into social and ethical science, the objective viewpoint. The best results were not possible from such an objective criterion, until we collected a considerable fund of accurate information about the working of the social organism¹² or of society as a whole, until we measured and defined a considerable number of social processes, and thus became able to define in a provisional way the socius or social object. Thanks to the work of the social technologists, the social psychologists, and other heretical psychologists (however defective parts of their work are), we have already made a beginning in this objective and constructive study of social processes. Men of affairs in government and practical activi-

¹² The term "social organism" will be used more or less in this study to indicate the unitary, vital, and functioning nature of social groups, and here of the largest group which we can characterize as being in some degree a unity of social functions, as possessing solidarity; and such can now be said of practically all mankind in some aspects of living. This usage must not be confounded with the biological and structural analogy of Spencer and his early continental imitators. The term as here employed is primarily functional in its meaning and is used because it implies a unity of functioning, a mutual dependence growing constantly greater with social development, which cannot be expressed by such an indefinite and non-descriptive term as "social process." To define the "social process" merely in terms of "the interaction of individuals" or socii, is analogous to stopping with the older natural philosophers who, before the formulation of the law of gravitation, accounted for movement in the physical world as the "continual flux of matter," i.e., the interaction of atoms, or of whatever elements the philosophers conceived matter as composed. As the law of gravitation established *how* matter moves, so must a functional and intelligent statement of the social process be in terms of the movement or tendency of that process and not leave it "at loose ends." The Group Struggle theorists state it in terms of increasing co-operation (cf. Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, secs. 63 ff.), and others define it in terms of growth of specialization and division of function or labor (cf. Durkheim, *De la division du travail social*, and Pioger, *La vie sociale*, 42 ff.). The point is the same. It emphasizes the growth in essential or organic unity of the group in the co-operative struggle for survival. It is in this sense that the group is organic, that society is an organism.

ties have always made large use of the objective method. They have defined or assumed their social objects and have built upon them—whether with good or bad results, depending largely upon the validity and accuracy of their definitions and assumptions. It is the function of a valid and accurate social science to make these definitions more definite. In this work a truly functional psychology can be of the greatest service.

With the coming of this objective treatment of the socius or social object and of the social processes, we may expect revolutions in our way of thinking and in our social policy. We may expect social conservation, instead of the individual democratic gratification of utilitarianism and of the old pseudo-democracy, to be the ideal of practice. This conservation will of necessity be in the nature of the strengthening and improvement of the whole social organism, of the whole social process. The conscious exertion of individuals must be directed toward the survival, growth, and perfection of the race with all that this implies and toward the development of a scientifically determined and controlled social organization which will contribute to this end.¹³ Such an organization of effort presupposes an adequate system of social control, a social control based upon popular will and sanction, but coercive where the consciously and scientifically determined ideal for the race is disregarded or violated, purposely or accidentally.

The detail and data for the argument that our traditional and still dominant ethical and social theory remains essentially individualistic and hedonistic (subjectivistic) in viewpoint, and for the necessity of reconstructing this viewpoint with its implications for social control, constitute the body of this study. It

¹³ Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 324, says, "The general trend of the development of scientific knowledge of human society is to establish three standards or norms, all of which have ethical implications: social survival, social efficiency, and social harmony." The only one of these three norms which he explains, however, is "survival," which would appear to be the ultimate standard or test of an intelligent social activity. Even if we explain the growth of society as increasing co-operation, we must explain co-operation finally in terms of survival. Cf. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid as a Factor in Evolution*; also Small, *op. cit.*, 38-39.

is held that, so long as individualism and subjectivism dominate, as they now do, our psychological and ethical theory, a scientific sociology and a constructive social policy will find themselves constantly opposed and weakened. It is contended that the solution of the problem lies in a change of emphasis from the old individualistic, though democratic, theory of egoistic satisfactions to an objective socially constructive policy. The treatment of the subject has been divided into three general sections. The first deals with the cause of the act, and attempts to determine what is the actual relation of feeling to the act. The second examines the theory that pleasure or happiness is the end or object of activity in its social relations, including a critical examination of a number of the utilitarian and hedonistic and other theories. The third is concerned with the object of, and the sanction for, a change in the theoretical criterion of the social control of activity.

II. THE NEURAL CORRELATE OF FEELING

FORMER VAGUENESS OF THE TERM FEELING.—EARLIER ATTEMPTS
AT CORRELATION.—THEORY OF THE CORRELATE OF FEELING
MODES.—RELATIVITY OF FEELING

In order to discuss intelligently the problems in this and the following chapters it will be necessary to devote most of the present chapter to an examination of the nature of feeling.

Even up to the present time most psychologists have pretty generally confounded feeling with sensory and ideational consciousness. The older writers used feeling as a general term for all consciousness,¹ and even some of our later psychologists so employ the term either wholly or in part.² No fact in modern psychological analysis is more patent than this confusion of feeling and the various forms of sensory and ideational consciousness. Though various writers had at different times pointed out that the same sensory processes and especially the

¹Hobbes, Helvetius, Bain, Spencer may be mentioned as examples. To Hobbes there were only two feelings in this general sense of all mental states mentioned above, appetite, desire, delight, pleasure, or joy, i.e., motion toward an object, on the one hand, and aversion, displeasure, pain, or grief, i.e., motion "fromward" the object, on the other hand ("Leviathan," *Works* [Molesworth ed.], III, 42-43). Of these feelings or emotions, however, he recognizes two classes, those of the senses and those of the mind. To those of the senses he applied the two general terms pleasure and pain, and to those of the mind, the general terms joy and grief. Since the above distinction has no qualitative value (Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, chap. xx), it is plain that Hobbes identified sensational and ideational consciousness. In order to take care of forms of consciousness and activity which would not come under this simple classification he added to this classification such psychical categories as hope, despair, fear, courage, anger, benevolence, ambition, magnanimity, jealousy, curiosity, etc. (*op. cit.*, 43 ff.). This method of providing for special cases is still in vogue, though in much less degree, among psychologists. Cf. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, chap. v; Marshall, *Pain, Pleasure, and Aesthetics*, 64 ff.

²Gustav Spiller, *The Mind of Man* (London, 1902), is an extreme example, though traces of such confusion can be found in James, *Principles of Psy.*, Dewey, *Psy.*, and others.

same sensory experiences, ideas, and images were not always accompanied by the same degrees of pleasantness and unpleasantness, or that the feeling tone might sometimes be one and sometimes the other,³ it was not until the types of sensations had been analyzed and abstracted beyond the traditional five, through the discoveries of neurology and experimental psychology, that it was possible to place the distinction on a scientific basis.⁴ The discovery of separate pain sense organs has furthered this distinction. For some writers, however, this further analysis has had the effect of strengthening the confusion in their minds regarding pain and unpleasantness,⁵ and it has led others to regard sex sensation as the original and fundamental type of pleasurable feeling.⁶ But for the great majority of psychologists these discoveries of separate sense organs have served to bring out more clearly the fact not adequately understood before, that the various sensory and ideational processes are not constant and fixed correlates of either pleasantness or unpleasantness.

Based on these distinctions the more recent psychologists have come to regard feeling as a separate type of consciousness, as neither sensory,⁷ nor ideational.⁸ It is variously accounted for by these writers as a functional correlate of the bodily, conscious, or neural processes, i.e., as indicating that the organism

³ E.g., Spencer, *Prin. of Psy.* (New York, 1892), I, 287.

⁴ Professor Max Meyer, *Psy. Rev.*, XI, 103 ff., claims at least sixteen separate types of sensations, with possibilities of more.

⁵ H. M. Stanley, *The Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling* (London, 1895), chap. ii, holds that pain was the most primitive form of consciousness.

⁶ Meyer refers to Lagerborg and others in this connection, *Psy. Rev.*, XV, 203 ff.

⁷ Stumpf, "Ueber Gefühlsempfindungen," *Zeitsch. für Psychologie*, Bd. 44, S. 1-49, however, regards pleasantness and unpleasantness as sensations. Lotze, *Microcosmus* (tr. Hamilton and Jones), I, 243, 689, takes a similar view, as does also L. F. Ward at times, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 38, 42 ff. Titchener, *The Psychology of Feeling and Attention*, 290 ff., criticizes the views of Stumpf and others, holding the sensational view as does Meyer, *op. cit.*

⁸ Cf. Angell, *Psy.*, 272 ff.; Judd, *Psy.*, 194; Titchener, *Outlines of Psy.*, 101, 108, 114; Ribot, "Sur la nature du plaisir," *Revue philosophique*, LXVIII, 181, 183; Meyer, *op. cit.*

as a whole is functioning successfully or unsuccessfully;⁹ as a sign that the vitality or health of the organism is being built up or lowered;¹⁰ or as connected with the use of stored-up nervous energy in less or greater quantities than the total supply available.¹¹ All these explanations assume that the feeling processes are the correlates of the whole bodily process, though Marshall makes some exceptions to this view in pointing out that some organ may be functioning "successfully," i.e., with pleasurable results, when the organism as a whole is not in such a favorable situation.¹² It has also been observed that there may be pleasantness or unpleasantness when the condition of the organism or the nature of the adjustment is exactly opposite what these formulae declare it to be.¹³ Again, while there is undoubtedly some correspondence between feeling modes and efficient functioning in a racial sense, there is not necessarily such a correspondence on a habitual or social basis.¹⁴ James Ward appears to have approached more nearly to a true statement of the relation when he reduced the correlation to terms of "effective" attention.¹⁵ This statement, however, is indefinite, since consciousness is a variable and relative manifestation dependent upon neural processes, and it lacks content, leaving the meaning of the term "effective" ambiguous. Some of the most effective attention, so far as objective adjustment consequences

⁹ Meakin, *Function, Feeling, and Conduct*, 55; Dewey, "Theory of Emotion," *Psy. Rev.*, II, 31; Simmel, *Einleitung in die Moralkwissenschaft*, I, 388; Judd, *Psy.*, 196-97.

¹⁰ Ribot, *op. cit.*, 180 ff.; Höfding, *op. cit.*, 273; Bain, *Mind and Body*, 59; Spencer, *Prin. of Psy.*, I, 279 (New York, 1876); Titchener, *op. cit.*, 102; Royce, *Outlines of Psy.*, 179.

¹¹ Marshall, *op. cit.*, 221.

¹² *Ibid.*, 264-65; also Meakin, *op. cit.*, 50.

¹³ Cf. Angell, *op. cit.*, 275.

¹⁴ Cf. Marshall, *op. cit.*, 352.

¹⁵ "There is pleasure in proportion as a maximum of attention is effectively exercised, and pain in proportion as such effective attention is frustrated by distractions, shocks, or incomplete and faulty adaptations, or fails of exercise owing to the narrowness of the field of consciousness and the slowness and smallness of its changes."—Art. "Psychology," *Encyc. Britannica* (9th ed.), XX, 71. Marshall (*op. cit.*, 236, 262), with reservations, and Stout (*Manual of Psy.*, 276), fully, accept this view.

are concerned, is not particularly pleasurable, as in the laborious acquirement of skill in any direction. The most considerable advance in the theory of feeling, however, was made by Meyer when he reduced the correlation of feeling modes from bodily to neural processes.¹⁶ His general statement, however, is couched in mechanical terms, and his failure to recognize the existence of two fundamental lines of development in the nervous system—a fact which must be taken into account in determining internal neural adjustment—has made it necessary for him to assume a rather doubtful differential character for pain, bitter, sour, and analogous sensory processes.¹⁷ Consequently these numerous exceptions destroy the unity of his theory.

All these theories of the correlate of feeling have something of value in them and have expressed partial truths. The earliest statement, going back at least as far as Hobbes among the moderns,¹⁸ and to Aristotle among the ancients,¹⁹ recognizes a more or less stable correspondence between the vital condition of the organism and its feeling modes. The development of accuracy of statement has been one of delimitation and specification of the terms of correlation, arriving at a consciousness correlate in the formula of James Ward, and at a neural correlate in that of Meyer. It is proposed here to modify Meyer's statement on the basis of the neurological investigations of Herrick, Sherrington, Parker, and others, using whatever is valuable in the other statements of correlation, in an attempt to secure an adequate functional statement of the correlation of

¹⁶ "The nervous correlate of pleasantness and unpleasantness must be *some form of activity in the higher nerve centers*, since it is generally admitted that only activities in the higher nerve centers are accompanied by consciousness, and pleasantness and unpleasantness are kinds of consciousness. But while the correlate of sensation is the nervous current itself, the *correlate of pleasantness and unpleasantness is the increase or decrease of the intensity of a previously constant current if the increase or decrease is caused by a force acting at a point other than the point of sensory stimulation.*"—"The Nervous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness," *Psy. Rev.*, XV, 307.

¹⁷ Cf. "The Nervous Correlate of Attention," *Psy. Rev.*, XV, 365 ff.

¹⁸ Cf. *Leviathan*, *loc. cit.*, 42.

¹⁹ Spencer, *op. cit.*, 277, makes this claim for Aristotle.

feeling modes, and thus to define feeling and to determine its relation to the act.

In formulating an adequate and functional theory of the neural correlate of feeling it is necessary to take into account the phylogeny of the nervous system. There are, throughout the scale of animal development, two distinct types of physiological functions: (1) the vegetative or visceral functions, connected with the inner working of the bodily mechanism, such as nutrition, circulation, respiration, and (2) the exteroceptive functions, concerned with the adjustment of the organism as a whole to outside or environmental influences.²⁰ These two types of organic functions, in rising above the purely tropic type of behavior, developed more or less distinct nervous connections,²¹ and because of the primary importance of quick movement for the preservation of the organism and of the species, the latter type of functions probably developed well-differentiated nervous connections and integrating centers first and specialized them to a greater degree than the former. This exteroceptive nervous system developed in the service of the animal in its reactions to external stimuli. Out of this general type of exteroceptive reaction developed the various peripheral or exteroceptive sense organs, such as those of a cutaneous nature—pain, temperature, tactual, chemical, and even the distance receptors, such as the sense organs of sight and hearing.²² It has been established that the mammalian cerebral cortex has developed mainly in the service of the distance receptors or higher exteroceptive sense organs of sight and hearing,²³ "which have dominated and set the direction of the evolution of the nervous system in vertebrates."²⁴ Thus the brain becomes in higher animal types the co-ordinating center of processes arising chiefly from peripheral or exterocep-

²⁰ Herrick, "The Evolution of Intelligence and Its Organs," *Science*, XXXI, 7.

²¹ Herrick, "The Relations of the Central and Peripheral Nervous Systems in Phylogeny," *The Anatomical Record*, IV, 62.

²² *Ibid.*, 62, 67, 68.

²³ Herrick, "The Relations of the Central and Peripheral Nervous Systems in Phylogeny," *The Anatomical Record*, IV, 61.

²⁴ Herrick, *Science*, *loc. cit.*, 8.

tive stimuli;²⁵ "while the co-ordinating centers of the visceral system are partly peripheral in the sympathetic ganglia and partly in this central nervous system."²⁶ In the higher and more flexible forms of nervous organization, where the tubular or dorsal nervous organization dominates,²⁷ the processes of the two systems are capable of close correlation in the higher brain centers. Where complex or conscious control is necessary all the activity tendencies of the nervous system tend to be, and for the most part are, summated in the cortex, which exists for this higher function of correlation rather than as a center for definitely specialized activity.²⁸

Two facts of primary importance for the theory of feeling correlates are to be noted in connection with the phylogenetic development of the nervous system or systems. The first is that the sex functions and their nervous connections developed primarily as a part of the visceral functions and system. In the lowest animal forms the sex and vegetative functions are very closely related. Parallel with the development of the feeding and other visceral and of the sexual neural processes they got more specialized connections with the exteroceptive nervous system and developed increased powers of correlation with the exteroceptive system in the cortex.²⁹ But the neural processes of the sex organs have always remained predominantly bound up with the structure and functioning of the visceral or interoceptive nervous system. In the second place, the exteroceptive nervous system originated primarily as a means of adapting the

²⁵ Herrick says, "The cerebellum has been developed from the somatic sensory column of the medulla oblongata as the chief central co-ordinating apparatus of the proprioceptive system."—*Anatom. Record, loc. cit.*, 64. See also Sherrington, *The Integrative Function of the Nervous System*, lecture ix.

²⁶ Herrick, *Anatom. Record*, IV, 62.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 59.

²⁸ "The essence of cortical function is correlation and a cortical center for the performance of a particular function is a physiological absurdity, save in the restricted sense described above, as a nodal point in a very complex system of associated conducting paths. Those reflexes whose simple functions can be localized in a single center have their mechanism abundantly provided for in the brain stem."—Herrick, *Science, loc. cit.*, 15.

²⁹ Cf. Herrick, *Anatom. Record*, IV, 61, and *Science*, XXXI, 8.

organism to its environment, either for separating it from conditions which threatened to be unfavorable to it or for bringing it in contact with food, warmth, light, etc. Purely peripheral stimulation, because of the predominatingly skeletal muscular connections of the exteroceptive system, has thus always resulted in movement, either of avoidance or of receptivity. The union of interoceptive or visceral processes with the exteroceptive or peripheral processes has, from very early stages of development, led to receptive movements, as in the case of inclosure and assimilation of food.³⁰ This latter type of movement will take place more effectively if the connection or correlation between the two types of processes (the exteroceptive and the interoceptive processes) is made in the cortex, where sensory stimuli may operate to a greater advantage, especially in the higher forms of animal life. But an equally primitive function of peripheral nervous stimulation, and one doubtless even more important at later stages of development, was disturbance of the equilibrium of the organism, looking toward an avoiding reaction. This type of nervous process may, in its origin, be identified in general with that which in higher organisms we find ending exteroceptively in the pain sense organ. The other cutaneous sense organs, with their neural connections, have probably been differentiated off primarily from this primitive type, as have also the distance receptors or higher peripheral sensory processes mentioned above. Taste and odor sense organs have also been differentiated in this way, but they have acquired or have retained a larger proportion of visceral neural connections than the other exteroceptive sense organs have.³¹

³⁰ Cf. G. H. Parker, "The Origin of the Nervous System and Its Appropriation of Effectors," *Pop. Sci. Mo.*, LXXV, 56, 137; Ludwig Edinger, "The Relations of Comparative Anatomy to Comparative Psychology," *Journal of Compar. Neurology and Psychol.*, XVIII, 437.

³¹ Cf. Herrick, *Anatom. Record*, IV, 68. Practical evidence of this is to be found in the familiar fact that odors and tastes have a much more marked effect upon visceral, glandular, and vascular activities than sight, hearing, touch, or temperature have. The odor (and even the sight) of blood also appears frequently to have a tendency to stimulate sexually, because of the close visceral connections.

The method by which the various types of exteroceptive sensory processes became differentiated from the more primitive exteroceptive avoiding processes was by means of lowering the threshold of stimulation for the sense organs which receive what are later tactual, temperature, etc., impressions. This lowering of the threshold of stimulation in the sense organs is correlated with the acquisition of more direct neural connection or correlation with the central nervous system than was provided by the primitive exteroceptive reactive apparatus, for definite or selective reactions. But, with the differentiation of primary centers within the brain for these different sense qualities, with the development of correlation pathways between the centers, and with the further elaboration of higher correlation centers, this acquisition of more direct connections and of connections with more highly differentiated centers has not destroyed the original neural connections or correlations with the general avoiding centers or processes, as is proven by the fact that an increased stimulation of any peripheral sense organ or exteroceptor other than a pain sense organ will also in higher animal forms give a pain reaction. The avoiding or pain connections and correlations of these differentiated processes have simply become relatively more indirect, while the original type of avoiding or pain process has remained unchanged structurally and has retained its original function.³² This lowering of the threshold of stimulation, and the acquisition of separate connections and correlations for each specific kind of contact or cutaneous receptors and distance receptors, as distinct from the primary undifferentiated avoiding or pain receptors, has made it possible to have correlations of various exteroceptive nervous processes giving rise to various forms of consciousness in the higher organisms without involving pain, though pain always lies in the background as a possibility of overstimulation, fatigue, etc.

If now we apply the general principle of the neural correlation of feeling of Meyer to this theory of the structure and

³² I am indebted to Professor Herrick for the suggestion of this general structural arrangement.

development of the nervous processes and their correlation of Herrick, Sherrington, Parker, and others, we shall see that the facts are taken care of readily. We find that where nervous processes are correlated, i.e., where on the one hand they supplement each other, at least in the regions of the cortex, we have the feeling mode of pleasantness, and on the other hand, where processes interrupt each other, at least in the cortex, we have the feeling mode of unpleasantness. Feeling, then, as distinct from sensory and ideational consciousness, is the result of the correlation, i.e., the supplementation or interference of nervous processes in such a way as to increase or to diminish the neural activity along a certain or given pathway. Where a nervous process or set is augmented pleasantness is experienced, and where a nervous process or set is weakened or diminished there is unpleasantness.³³ Accordingly both pleasantness and unpleasantness may exist in the same organism at the same time, provided different nervous sets are involved in the adjustment process or more than one adjustment is being made.³⁴

³³ It is not necessary to raise the question here as to when either feeling or sensory consciousness first appeared phylogenetically. The purpose here is to show certain developmental and relational facts of structure and functioning in the correlation of the visceral, exteroceptive, and ideational (free cortical) neural processes, which will serve as a basis for the theory of the neural correlation of feeling modes—whenever and wherever in the development process feeling may have appeared. It is not here maintained that the existence of sensory neural processes or receptors necessarily implies sensation, or that correlation (supplementation and interference) of processes necessarily implies feeling at earlier stages of development than that of man. The presumption would be of course that they do. Professor Herrick takes the view that consciousness is in a broad sense the function of both cortical and subcortical nervous processes (*Science, loc. cit.*, 17) and that it did not originate as a superimposition upon biological processes, but as a part of the general organism in adjustment or activity (*ibid.*). But, since we know that almost all ideational and imaginal consciousness comes either directly or indirectly from the exercise of the higher sensory neural processes, and especially from the activity of the distance receptors (cf. Herrick, *ibid.*, 8), the admission of the existence of sensation arising from primitive peripheral and from visceral and sex neural sensory processes and of feeling resulting from the correlation of these and other processes at a very early stage would not involve any high degree of other conscious control at such a stage.

³⁴ Cf. Ribot, *op. cit.*, 180; Meyer, *Psy. Rev.*, XV, 315; Angell, *Psy.*, 275; Titchener, *op. cit.*, 108.

According to the theory of the nervous system here accepted we should expect, from their close phylogenetic connections, that the visceral neural processes, such as those of digestion, circulation, respiration, etc., would, when working properly, tend to supplement each other, and consequently that their unimpeded action would, when we are conscious of it, produce pleasantness. As a matter of fact we find that such is the case.³⁵ In the same way sexual neural processes, because of their close structural connection with the visceral or vegetative neural processes, tend strongly to supplement the latter, carrying the correlation into the cortex and involving tactual, temperature, etc., sensory supplementation from the exteroceptive system, with the result that sexual activity ordinarily is highly pleasurable. But on the other hand the primitive peripheral or exteroceptive neural processes, i.e., the pain sensory neural processes, are so implanted in the nervous structure phylogenetically that they tend to interrupt the visceral or interoceptive neural processes when they come in contact with them, and even to interrupt the derivative sensory neural processes when the latter run over from their more direct connections or correlations with their own immediate instinctive response centers or cortical correlations, i.e., when stimulation is unduly increased. Consequently stimulation of the pain sense organs or strong stimulation of any peripheral sense organ is usually unpleasant.³⁶ The fundamental interruptive nature of the pain sensory neural processes under strong stimulation makes it impossible to secure a correlation of them with higher neural sensory processes or with visceral neural processes and thus to make a high degree of pain pleasurable.³⁷ It is because of these two fundamental types of cor-

³⁵ Digestion tends to increase circulation, as does bodily exercise. Exercise promotes both a strong respiration and a rapid circulation and the result is distinctly pleasurable, if all the processes work normally.

³⁶ Cases in which slight stimulation of pain sense organs produces apparently a mild degree of pleasantness evidently depend upon the inhibition or assimilation of the pain sensory neural processes involved by some visceral or peripheral neural set.

³⁷ This statement of the neural correlation avoids the contradiction which Meyer had to meet (cf. *Psy. Rev.*, XV, 366), to the effect that supplementation

relation of visceral or vegetative (and sex) and pain sensory neural processes, with their almost invariably pleasant and unpleasant feeling results, respectively, that feeding and sex activities on the one hand and pain sensations on the other have been so stubbornly and almost universally identified with pleasantness and unpleasantness feeling modes.³⁸ The explanation of feeling in terms of neural correlation instead of in terms of sensory or ideational consciousness does away with this confusion.

of pain processes by higher sensory or ideational neural processes may tend to make pain processes the correlates of a high degree of pleasantness. According to the theory here developed, supplementation of pain and visceral (including sex) neural processes by the higher sensory or ideational neural processes could never take place independent of the predominating vegetative or interoceptive neural set, because of the phylogenetic origins and functions of pain and sex processes. So that any interference with or supplementation of either of them would cause it to tend only to have a diminished or increased effect of its customary kind.

³⁸ Such a confusion of terminology and of thinking exists in practically all our polite literature and in most scientific writing where the relations are involved. Reasons for such confusion are: the fact that vegetative, sex, and pain sensory correlations with the interoceptive and exteroceptive neural processes being among the most primitive and instinctive and hence most closely correlated structurally and functionally, pain and sex sensations and activities more invariably correspond to unpleasant and pleasant feeling modes, while the other sensory and ideational neural processes vary more widely; that the higher sensory and ideational neural processes may actually connect up with the lower visceral and exteroceptive neural processes so as to produce the sensations of the latter (as in suggestion); the close resemblance between these lower sensations and the feeling modes to which they usually correspond, while the higher sensory and ideational experiences differ radically from the feeling modes with which they instinctively, habitually, or fortuitously occur. Arguments against the validity of such confusion are: just this fact that a variety of sensory experiences occur in connection with apparently the same feeling modes; the fact that pleasantness and unpleasantness can be experienced in connection with the higher sensory and ideational neural processes and the lower visceral neural processes without calling out any pain or sex or other visceral sensation whatever; and finally the fact that sensations are localized and feeling modes are not. It appears that the similarity must be accounted for on the basis of the close connection of these sensory and activity processes with the feeling correlations in their instinctive or phylogenetic origin rather than as a matter of identity. But, even if feeling modes should be demonstrated to be only abstractions from sensory and ideational consciousness, it would not affect this theory of correlation and the resulting theory of the relativity of feeling as a criterion or valuation of activity.

The feeling modes experienced in connection with the correlated exercise of the other exteroceptive sensory processes can be explained in terms of the same general nervous correlation. The bitter and sour sensory neural processes, the neural processes of the sense organs of the nauseating odors, etc., because of their relation to survival, have been so implanted, i.e., correlated, in the nervous system phylogenetically that when they are excited they tend to interrupt the existing visceral neural processes or sets³⁹ and, if the disturbance is very great, to bring the conflict of processes into the cortex and thus to arouse disagreeable consciousness. They tend frequently also to inhibit or interrupt the various exteroceptive sensory neural processes, such as those of sight and hearing. In either case the conflict of processes results not only in unpleasantness (where consciousness is involved) but also tends to produce a new disposition of the organism and of its organs for the purpose of escape from the stimulus.⁴⁰ In a similar manner the sensory neural processes connected with the sense organs of sweet and those of the various ordinarily pleasing odors, tend to strengthen the more fundamental visceral neural processes and exteroceptive combinations with them, producing a flow of saliva in the glands, forward or receptive movement, etc.

In the case of sight and hearing, the nervous processes are not so closely connected with the visceral neural processes, but more closely with the other processes of the peripheral or exteroceptive nervous system. Here we find that sharp and

³⁹ The nerves of taste and smell have much stronger visceral or interoceptive connections than those of sight or hearing have. Cf. Herrick, *Anatom. Record*, IV, 68.

⁴⁰ Smell and taste are by no means infallible guides, in their pleasantness and unpleasantness manifestations, especially for many of the odors and chemical combinations or tastes produced in a social or civilized order of technical control, though they are pretty reliable guides in the instinctive or uncultural animal world. Consequently ideational consciousness has to be brought into play to determine when in cultural life we can safely make exceptions to our instinctive reactions on the basis of feeling consciousness arising from smell and taste neural correlations. A similar higher conscious reference is also necessary in connection with sight and hearing and all the other peripheral senses.

amorphous sounds (noises) and sudden and unharmonious visual impressions tend to inhibit or disturb the nervous sets with which the auditory and visual neural processes are connected, even going over into positive pain reactions, as described above, if the stimuli are strong enough. The results are an attempt to escape from the stimulus, on the objective side of behavior, and the feeling mode of unpleasantness on the subjective side when consciousness is involved. On the other hand, rhythmical sounds and symmetrical visual impressions tend to result in neural processes which supplement the neural sets with which they are connected and thus to produce receptive or advancing movements and the feeling mode of pleasantness when consciousness is involved.⁴¹

In the case of the contact receptors, or the cutaneous sense organs, the correlation of neural processes is much more simple and direct. Increase of stimuli more readily leads over into a direct pain response, on the one hand, while correlation of neural processes either by way of supplementation or interruption of other connected neural processes, in the cortex or elsewhere, takes place more readily and less variantly. For example we may respond to temperature or tactual stimulation either unconsciously, or with the consciousness of both pleasantness and unpleasantness, or even with both unpleasantness and pain, and sometimes with pain and pleasantness, as in a case where we enjoy the warmth of the fire and at the same time experience pain from overstimulation of some of the temperature sense organs. Similarly, scratching or caressing may be both pleasurable and painful, pleasant alone, or without conscious results whatever.

⁴¹ Wild animals—and even human beings—are easily disturbed by a sharp sound or a distorted image in the periphery of the retina, while both animals and men may be pacified and even hypnotized by the regular recurrence of sounds or objects (rhythm and regular space movements) provided the recurrence is not abrupt. The device of providing simple music to increase the labor activity of workers is known to savages and was largely employed by tyrants and others in early times. The fact that we see landscapes, pictures, buildings, etc., in a series of planes is well known to landscape gardeners, architects, sculptors, painters, etc. Cf. Hirn, *Origins of Art*; Hildebrand, *The Problem of Form in Painting and Sculpture* (tr. Meyer and Ogden), New York, 1907.

The same general relationship of support and interference is also true of the ideational neural processes or highest cortical processes. But here the interference and supplementary connections appear to be the result of habit or training rather than of heredity—unless the cases in which the ideational neural processes arouse the sensory or visceral neural processes through association and thus establish relations with the basic vegetative neural set, with the usual results, can be shown to be hereditary connections.⁴²

Thus the neural processes from the primitive visceral processes and the most primitive visceral and peripheral sensory neural processes (those later recognized as connected with sex and pain sensory consciousness) up through the various forms of exteroceptive sensory processes—the contact receptors and the distance receptors of the exteroceptive system, and the interoceptively connected peripheral sensory processes of taste and smell, standing in point of rank between these two—to and including the highest ideational neural or cortical processes, furnish a descending scale of hereditary or instinctive correlation, i.e., supplementation and inhibition or interference, with the prevailing basic neural sets and processes. Those processes developed latterly in phylogeny appear to be less definitely and irreversibly associated by heredity in this way, till in the higher

⁴² Examples of such correlations are, the thinking of food one likes with the imagined sensory appearance of its specific flavor and “watering” of the mouth, imaging of a sharp knife inflicting a wound with a dimmed imaginary sensation of pain and stiffening or shuddering or squirming movement of the body, etc. Whether we inherit any such correlations or merely acquire them is still a question in psychology. We certainly have large capacity for breaking up such co-ordinations, as in “getting used” to things. Some others that are unquestionably acquired are our attitudes toward books, people, pets, houses in which we live, various hobbies, etc. Professor Herrick, in speaking of the indefiniteness of the correlations of the higher neural processes in vertebrates, says, “In short, the educational period is limited to the age during which the epigenetic tissue, i.e., the correlation centers whose form is not predetermined in heredity, retains its plasticity under environmental influence. Ultimately even the cerebral cortex matures and loses its powers of reacting except in fixed modes. Its unspecialized tissue—originally a diffuse and equipotential nervous meshwork—becomes differentiated along definite lines and the fundamental pattern becomes more or less rigid.”—*Science*, XXXI, 10.

ideational neural processes it is doubtful if there is any but acquired definite correlation at all. Corresponding to these inherited and acquired neural attitudes of supplementation and conflict we have throughout the series a correlation of feeling modes, pleasantness and unpleasantness. Thus we find that pleasantness is usually connected with sex, sweet, etc., sensory and corresponding ideational neural processes, since these processes, because of their phylogenetic connections, usually supplement or strengthen the dominant neural sets. In the same way we ordinarily find unpleasantness associated with pain, bitter, sour, etc., sensory and related ideational neural processes, since these are generally inhibitive of the prevailing neural sets, because of their phylogenetic connections. But this close inherited neural adjustment and its correlative feeling adjustment is not definite and fixed. Both inherited and acquired pathways which are either inhibitive of or supplementary to the prevailing set may be modified so that it cannot be said of any one process, however fundamental phylogenetically, that it always and invariably results in either mode of feeling. In the higher and therefore less stable and less hereditary adjustments the interchange between interference and co-operation of processes is quite marked, so that in this region (as in a large range of visual and auditory impressions) it becomes quite impossible to foretell what feeling mode will follow the sensory impression, unless one is familiar with the habit acquirements of the person receiving it.

But with a completer development of the cortex or end segment and as the higher exteroceptive sensory neural processes (such as those of vision and audition) and finally the higher ideational neural processes⁴³ are added to the lower exteroceptive sensory and motor, and the visceral, neural processes (such as the sensory processes of pain and sex connec-

⁴³ Professor Herrick makes consciousness a part of the general system of biological control. It is significant that the major part of imagery is visual and auditory, graduating down through the other senses to pain, thus verifying Professor Herrick's statement that "the distance receptors . . . have dominated and set the direction of the evolution of the nervous system in vertebrates" (*Science*, XXXI, 8).

tions and those of circulation, respiration, and digestion), the center of control of the organism is greatly modified. The ideational neural processes exert a large though perhaps not principal control over man, while the visceral and exteroceptive neural processes of various grades are most fundamental in making adjustments among the lower animals, where the nervous equipment is more nearly limited to these processes. In this way man comes to have a sensory and ideational life largely apart from the lower sensory and vegetative existence. A great deal of visual and auditory and cortical activity goes on without any appreciable connection with the lower nervous dispositions or sets, i.e., the vegetative, the sex and pain processes. We engage in conversation, we discuss problems in science, we hear music, view pictures, etc., with but little increase in vascular or respiratory activity and usually with no overt or conscious evidence of pain or organic and sexual neural activity. The explanation of this fact must be that the higher sensory and ideational neural processes are capable of going on without the necessity of neural correlation with the lower exteroceptive and visceral processes. Yet at such times we may have the most vivid feeling experience of pleasantness or unpleasantness. These feelings are certainly aroused in connection with scientific work, with viewing a picture or landscape, or viewing a back alley or dump, or with hearing music, quite as much as in connection with exercise, digestion, or sex and pain stimulation.⁴⁴ Evidently, therefore, we can have interference and supplementation of the higher sensory and ideational neural processes regardless more or less of the lower neural processes. However, even if such correlation is never wholly independent of the lower processes,⁴⁵ the connection is often so slight that we may have pleasantness or unpleasantness practically inde-

⁴⁴ Meyer thinks that feelings arising from higher sensory or ideational neural co-ordinations are the stronger. Cf. *Psy. Rev.*, XV, 320-21.

⁴⁵ Different people appear to vary largely in this respect, some being very emotional and others being in most respects habitually cool and unruffled. For some people all kinds of ideational and even higher sensory activity have marked overt results, in increased respiration, vascular extension (as blushing), etc., while other people experience none of these. Many people cannot, at least with-

pendent of or in opposition to them. Frequently we experience pleasantness thus aroused when we also have vascular and respiratory depression, or even pains of indigestion, surface pains, etc. In the same way unpleasantness arising from correlation of cortical and higher sensory neural processes may be experienced along with strong normal visceral activity. This antithesis is even more marked in the field of pathology.

Thus it appears that, whether we have to do with feeling in its more primitive aspect of direct or indirect correlation of visceral processes or of visceral with exteroceptive processes, or with feeling in its later evolutionary and functional aspect of correlations of the higher sensory and ideational neural processes more or less independent of the visceral and lower exteroceptive neural processes, such correlation is a purely internal matter. Feeling is a purely personal or individualistic phenomenon.⁴⁶

Feeling is a simple or relatively unreflective form of consciousness, serving to make elementary adjustments of avoidance and acceptance of a more complex character than those made to direct stimulation and of a less complex character than those made on the basis of reflective or ideational consciousness. Just as feeling is not connected with simple sensation, so also it is at a minimum in the most complex thinking. It is only where we can go no further in thought, or when the thinking is really ended and the matter is "clear in our minds," when the problem is solved, that we have unpleasantness and pleasantness respectively as correlates of neural processes involved in higher thinking activity.⁴⁷ Really complex, i.e., the

out practice, inhale putrid odors or even look upon blood or a painful performance without becoming sick and possibly vomiting. Sharp words sometimes, as does fatigue, bring sensations of pain to the surface of the body. Ellis (*Studies in the Psychology of Sex*) gives an instance of a woman habitually having primary sexual experience upon hearing music. Erotic music and pictures and histrionic representations generally have some such effect, usually in a milder degree, as is well known. But the ordinary forms of conversation and the higher forms of reasoning are usually without such visceral, or pain and sex concomitants as would indicate any particular neural connection.

⁴⁶ Judd, *Psy.*, 193, 202.

⁴⁷ Cf. James Ward, *op. cit.*; and Dewey, "Theory of Emotion," *Psy. Rev.*, II, 31.

more sophisticated social, adjustments are not made on the basis of feeling response, just as they are not made on the basis of mere sensory reaction.

Feeling is also entirely relative as regards its object.⁴⁸ In connection with the lower and more instinctive processes, correlations are more or less definite and fixed, though apparently never completely and irreversibly so. Pain is usually unpleasant; sweet is usually pleasant. But the higher and more habitual or relatively uncontrolled processes enter into less and less definite correlations the higher we go in the exteroceptive scale, till we reach the stage of highly indefinite cortical correlations. These correlations can be made relatively definite however by fixing habits. As a matter of fact any habitual or instinctive correlation can be broken up or reformed, that is, any act may be made pleasant or unpleasant. The scourge, the sedentary self-torture amid vermin and filth of the Hindu fanatics, or the similar isolation of Stylites on the column, laceration of one's body, etc., may become sources of pleasure; while the taking of savory food, the sound of sweetest music, the odor of roses, or the sexual act may become the agents of the most unbearable unpleasantness. For this reason feeling modes cannot be effective guides to social adjustment and control. In a purely instinctive or static, i.e., habit-controlled, world where, hypothetically, everything remains forever the same, feeling might operate as a successful criterion for race adjustment. It might, barring cataclysm and the unexpected, work toward the escape from danger and the reproduction and feeding of the greatest number of individuals not competing or co-operating with each other, except on an animal plane—though this may be said to be doubtful.⁴⁹ But in a world where training must modify instinct, where the cultural and artificial rather than the habitual and "natural" set the standard, in a social and moral world in the best sense,

⁴⁸ Cf. Titchener, *op. cit.*, 108.

⁴⁹ Cf. S. J. Holmes, "Pleasure, Pain, and Intelligence," *Jour. of Compar. Neurology and Psychol.*, XX, 148-49.

feeling cannot serve as a guide for the preservation of the individual and much less of society.

This principle of the relativity of feeling and of its unreliableness as a guide or measure of values is applicable throughout the present discussion. In a less degree, the same relativity can be predicated of all conscious processes. That no idea, image, or sensory process is always absolutely valid or fixed in content has been pretty well known from the time of Locke.⁵⁰ That is to say, no subjectivistic criterion is wholly dependable as a measure of values, and any such criterion is the more dependable the more it is checked up by objective reference, i.e., by sensory experiences and objective controls of as many types as possible. Feeling as the conscious part of mere correlation, i.e., as supplementation and interference of neural processes, is the least able to be so checked up, and is consequently the least reliable of all subjective criteria or evaluations of action in an objective and social world. Thus in the light of a better knowledge of the total biological functioning, the statements of both old and modern psychologists and philosophers to the effect that pleasure is a sign of the health of the organism, of its successful functioning, of the presence of energy, etc.,⁵¹ appear absolutely inadequate. Feeling indicates only certain internal nervous adjustments on the basis of instinctive or habitual disposition and not gross and inclusive bodily or organic adjustments. Such views indicate a closer acquaintance with the hypothetical and simplified conditions of instinctive life or of life regulated by the philosopher's logic than with the more complex determinants of human social life. These are facts which the sociology of the future, if it is to be functional, must apply.

⁵⁰ Cf. Locke, *op. cit.*, Bk. II, chaps. xxix-xxxii.

⁵¹ Cf. Ribot, Bain, Judd, Titchener, Marshall, etc., above.

III. THE CAUSE OF THE ACT

NATURE OF THE ACT.—THEORIES OF THE CAUSE OF THE ACT.—

THE ACTUAL CAUSE OF THE ACT.—FEELING AS CAUSE.—THE

CAUSE OF THE ACT AS RELATED TO THE END OF THE
ACTIVITY

The problem of this chapter is to determine the relation of feeling to the act. Preliminary to discussing this matter in detail it seems necessary, (1) briefly to analyze the act itself and (2) to review the conclusions of a number of representative writers on the relation of feeling to the act.

Up to the time when Bain formulated the theory of spontaneity in activity,¹ not much distinction had been made in philosophical and psychological discussion between conscious and unconscious activity. It was rather the custom of writers up to that time to ignore all activity except that of which the actor was supposed to be conscious. Their investigations of activity were logical rather than biological and functional.² Though Bain was largely influenced in his contribution by the development of biological knowledge, his successors in mental science, with greater opportunity for such investigation, have not made the advance in this line of thinking that might have been expected of them. The distinction between unconscious and conscious activity is still very inadequately if at all applied to ethical and social science, and has not entered effectively even into psychology, which still continues to be largely logical and

¹ *Emotions and Will* (3d ed.), 201. For a recent statement of the theory see Jennings, *Behavior of the Lower Organisms*, 284 ff.

² This attitude was probably the result of the old theocratic philosophy which looked upon man as provided either with an infallible and omniscient conscience or with an equally infallible objective revelation which he was supposed to be able in some unexplained way to interpret omnisciently. In other words, the philosophy which posited an omniscient and all-conscious deity also posited an omniscient and all-conscious human being as the deity's correlate or alter.

structural.³ This limitation of the treatment of the act was a great stumbling-block to the utilitarians and to their predecessors and successors.

To avoid the limitations imposed by such a conception of activity we may be justified, perhaps, in isolating four different types of activity with reference to the degree of consciousness involved in the conduct. The first is activity from mass impact. The human organism, of course, never reacts exactly like an inanimate object, because its internal capacity for ready adjustment, for breaking shock and controlling the direction of motion, is essentially different. But there are nevertheless a very large number of organic movements which are beyond the immediate powers of adjustment by the individuals—discounting, of course, the nearly constant influence of gravity. This is, socially considered, the least important type of activity and may for the present be ignored. The second is reflexive and instinctive and habitual activity proceeding from stimuli over which the organism is for the most part in control, but in which consciousness does not enter till after the act, if at all, and consequently cannot be a guide to that act. The third is a subdivision of the second, in which activity is instinctively and reflexively initiated, but in which consciousness enters in the midst of the act as a “corrective” to secure more efficient control. The fourth is a type in which the activity is more or less consciously planned and in which the organism consciously seeks stimulus to the activity. It is impossible, however, completely to foresee all the conditions of an act, i.e., to anticipate all the stimuli and to estimate accurately the resistance of the organism to the stimuli. Consequently no previsioned act is ever wholly consciously controlled.⁴ The second and third types of activity are by far the most important individually and socially, while the fourth is of secondary importance in the matter of maintaining social adjustment and control, though it must always be appealed to in mak-

³ For further discussion of this point see McDougall, *Physiological Psy.*, 1, 2.

⁴ Woodworth brings this fact out clearly in “The Cause of a Voluntary Movement,” *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology* (Garman Memorial Volume).

ing radical changes or in projecting social ideals. But the larger part of social activity and social conformity is not on this plane. The fourth is really the conscious part of the third, more or less abstracted and adequately controlled. It is this particular fourth type of activity with which the utilitarians and other earlier philosophers dealt, and it is to this type also that modern ethicists and many sociologists insist upon confining themselves.⁵ Any complete statement of the social process, i.e., of social adjustments, and hence of the conditions of social activity, must rest upon all four types. The very assumption that feeling (as a form of consciousness) alone is the cause of conduct and activity is a negation of all except the last.

From Hobbes to Meakin,⁶ the latest apologist for the hedonic criterion in ethics and in social control, the line of emphasis has not essentially changed among the advocates of feeling as the cause of activity.⁷ Hobbes held, in his own terminology, that both ideas of activities accompanied by pleasantness and unpleasantness and the feelings themselves are causes of activity.⁸ All the other hedonistic psychologists and philosophers explicitly or indirectly emphasize the same relationship between feeling and action.⁹ Only a few mention other than conscious

⁵ Cf. Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*; Judd, *Psy. Rev.* (March, 1910), 78, 80; Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 129-30; Small, *General Sociology*, 184, as examples.

⁶ *Function, Feeling, and Conduct* (New York, Putnam, 1910).

⁷ In considering the various views of the cause of the act based upon a hedonistic criterion, it is necessary to keep in mind the great diversity of meanings which feeling has had in the history of psychology, and also the fact that it is often very difficult to determine whether the conscious process which any particular author has in mind is sensory, ideational, or feeling proper.

⁸ Hobbes says that pleasures and pains of sense move us directly to action, since they are "motions" or "endeavours" which proceed from external objects through the sense organs to the heart and there appear as "appetite" and "aversion" (*Leviathan, loc. cit.*, 42). Other motions "arise from the expectation, that proceeds from the foresight of the end, or consequences of things; whether these things in the sense please or displease." These are pleasures and pains of the mind and likewise impel to action (*ibid.*, 43).

⁹ The citations in this and the two following notes are necessarily incomplete. They embrace, however, as large a number of fields of investigation and

causes of activity. All however agree that no conscious activity can be caused otherwise than by feeling, though all at different times plainly confuse feeling with sensory and ideational processes proper. All alike appear to be ignorant of this distinction, though contemporaries of some of the later writers have pointed it out more or less clearly.

as large a scope of territory as are possible within the limits of space available, keeping in mind, of course, the fact that the main discussion of this study centers around the English and American ethical and social philosophy. For additional citations in convenient form, see Wright, *op. cit.*

Helvetius goes a step farther than Hobbes and assumes, besides a world of physical forces, one of mental forces in which pleasure and pain are masters of activity and thought: "[God says to man] Je te mets sous la garde du plaisir et de la douleur: l'un et l'autre veilleront à tes pensées, à tes actions; engendreront tes passions; exciteront tes aversions, tes amités, tes tendresses, tes fureurs; allumeront tes désirs, tes craintes, tes espérances; te dévoileront des vérités; te plongeront dans des erreurs; et, après t'avoir fait enfanter mille systèmes absurdes et différents de morale et de législation, te découvriront un jour les principes simples, au développement desquels est attaché l'ordre et le bonheur du monde moral" (*De l'esprit*, 322). Locke: "That which immediately determines the will . . . to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire fixed upon some negative (absent) good," as freedom from pain and "enjoyment of pleasure." And that which moves desire is "Happiness, and that alone" (*op. cit.*, Bk. II, chap. xxi, secs. 33 and 41). Bentham: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do" (*op. cit.*, chap. i, sec. 1). Also, "Among all the several psychological entities . . . the main pillars or foundations of all the rest—the matter of which all the rest are composed— . . . will be . . . seen to be, *Pleasures and Pains*." These are the "springs of action" ("The Springs of Action," *Works* [ed. Bowring], I, 211). Bain: "Some pleasure or pain, near or remote, is essential to every volitional effort, or every change from quiescence to movement, or from one movement to another" (*Emotions and Will* [3d ed.], 350). "Without some antecedent of pleasurable or painful feeling—actual or ideal, primary or derivative—the will cannot be stimulated" (*ibid.*, 354). He defines volition as "the operation of pleasures and pains for stimulating activities for ends" (*ibid.*, 315-16). Movements are at first spontaneous and random (*Senses and Intellect*, 300). Suitable activities are selected and fixed by pleasure, which has become fortuitously connected with them (*Emotions and Will*, 315). Baldwin takes essentially the same view (*Handbook of Psychology; Emotions and Will*, 301-3). He also has an elaborate classification of motives (*ibid.*, 332). Leslie Stephen: "Pain and pleasure are . . . the determining causes of action . . . the sole and ultimate causes. . . . Will is always determined by the actual painfulness or pleasantness of the choice at the moment of choosing" (*Science of Ethics*, 50). The feeling is reflected back from the provisioned act, as it

There are two other types of writers—only partially or not at all hedonistic, though for the most part individualistic, in their viewpoint—who deal with the cause of the act. Those of one class regard feeling as one, and only one, of the factors in determining conscious choice.¹⁰

were, and becomes the actual motive force (*ibid.*, 54). He regards feeling as a true psychical force (*ibid.*, 57). Lester F. Ward also regards the feelings, especially after memory has made them into desires (*Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 52), as psychic forces (*Pure Sociology*, 132), and he even terms the science of the operation of these desires "mental physics" or *psychics* (*Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 129). This is a terminology which reminds one somewhat of Hobbes (*op. cit.*, 42) and of Comte in a more general sense (*Positive Philosophy* [Martineau's transl.], Bk. VI). Painful and pleasurable sensations, he says further, are respectively the causes of action away from and toward objects (*Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 126). He also declares that desire, which he characterizes as "in its essential nature . . . a form of pain" (*ibid.*, 54), "is the all-pervading, world-animating principle, the universal *nisus* and pulse of nature, the mainspring of all action, and the life-power of the world" (*ibid.*, 55). Spencer: "The feelings have in common the character that they cause bodily action which is violent in proportion as they are intense" (*Principles of Psy.*, II, 541). "The emotions are the masters, the intellect is the servant. The guidance of our acts through perception and reason has for its end the satisfaction of feelings" ("Feeling vs. Intellect," *Facts and Comments*, 38). L. F. Ward, Bain, and others concur in this view. J. R. Angell: "Some such symbols [as agreeableness and disagreeableness] there must be, if consciousness is to steer successfully among new surroundings and in strange environments" (*Psy.*, 273). S. N. Patton: "There is always an endeavor to increase pleasure and to avoid pain if the animal is conscious of these emotions" (*Theory of Social Forces*, chap. i, sec. 1). Jevons bases his theory entirely upon a calculation of pleasure and pain and declares the object of political economy to be to determine the maximum amount of happiness which can be realized in purchasing the greatest possible amount of pleasure with the least possible amount of pain (*Theory of Political Economy* [3d ed.], 37). Frederick Meakin: "For the ground of choice we are referred, ultimately, to the pleasurable or painful functional act" (*op. cit.*, 37).

¹⁰ Titchener regards attention as the only cause of voluntary action in primitive consciousness, and in his opinion attention was limited to the intrinsically pleasant and unpleasant (*Outlines of Psy.*, 250). With the introduction of *action upon representation*, or with the appearance of memory, other elements than affection came to operate in psychical causation (*ibid.*, 254 ff.). Thorndike declares that "any mental state may serve as a motive. . . . One of the most artificial doctrines about human nature which has ever acquired prominence is the doctrine that pleasure and pain, felt or imagined, are the only motives to action, that a human being is constantly making a conscious or unconscious calculation of the amount of each which the contemplated act will produce, and

Those of the other type hold that feeling can never be such a cause.¹¹ The main value of a study of these views consists in the fact that, (1) it indicates the confusion in which all mental, ethical, and social science has been and yet is, in regard to a criterion for the cause of the act; (2) it points out through

that his entire behavior is the result of such a life-long complicated series in sums in addition and subtraction. Pleasure and pain do play a leading rôle in determining action, but the cast of characters includes also percepts, ideas and emotions of all sorts" (*Elements of Psy.*, 284). Lotze: "The pleasure of sense is not only the goal toward which all the activity of living creatures originally moves, but we find that in civilized life also it is the hidden spring of the most various actions" (*op. cit.*, I, 696-97). He adds, however, that conscience is the only absolute guide (*ibid.*, I, 696). Sidgwick recognizes "pleasure" and "pain" as "feelings" which stimulate to actions producing or sustaining the former and removing or averting the latter (*Methods of Ethics*, 42, 43). However, "A man's conscious [!] desire is," he thinks, "more often than not chiefly extra-regarding" (*ibid.*, 51), while impulses occur quite regardless of pleasant or unpleasant results (*ibid.*, 53). Thus Sidgwick holds to a teleological statement of unconscious as well as conscious activities. Martineau holds that if one exercises prudential preference he may act with regard to pleasurable or painful effects, but that the springs of action within us [conscience] are the proper moral guides, and they do not take cognizance of pleasure and pain (*op. cit.*, II, 70).

¹¹ Between Martineau's view (mentioned in the preceding note), aside from his criterion of conscience, and the views of Sorley, James, Dewey, Butler, and others there is little difference, aside from terminology and a more complete analysis of the act. All these latter writers hold that the idea must be the immediate or actual cause of the act. Sorley: "We must aim not at pleasure *per se* but at objects which we have reason to believe will be accompanied by pleasurable feeling" (*Ethics of Naturalism*, 188). James: "A willed movement is a movement preceded by an idea of itself" (*op. cit.*, II, 580). Ideas of pleasure and pain are among these "motor spurs" (*ibid.*, II, 559). James's use of language is sometimes contradictory, and one could in places make out that he argues that "pleasure and pain" are direct causes. This doubtless results from his constantly confusing feeling with sensation. Höffding: "The impulse is essentially determined by an idea, is a striving after the content of this idea," which, however, may refer to pleasure-giving experience (*op. cit.*, 323). Butler long ago maintained that "all particular appetites and passions are towards *external things themselves*, distinct from the *pleasure arising from them*," and that "there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitability between the object and the passion" (Sermon XI). Green takes essentially the same view (*op. cit.*, 168) as does Dewey (Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, 270), though the latter adds that "the anticipation of pleasure in its fulfilment may normally intensify the putting forth of energy, may give an extra reinforcement to flagging effort" (*ibid.*, 271). Marshall holds that "pleasure-pain" may serve to fix the useful

illustrations that until recently at least, if not still, feeling modes have been regarded by most writers of importance as the only or the chief causes of the consciously chosen act; (3) that those, like Martineau and Lotze, who thought of the act as properly caused in some other way, were prone to substitute some other more or less individualistic criterion, such as conscience, as the cause, as will appear more clearly in chap. iv when the ends of action are discussed. (4) It is apparent also that some of the older writers, like Hobbes, Helvetius, and Bentham, did not take into consideration any causes other than conscious ones; nor has this confusion wholly disappeared at the present time. (5) We have also an indication, though incomplete, of how the prevailing social theory until the most recent times has followed the lead of Bentham, Locke, and Hobbes in accepting a hedonistic psychological basis. An expansion of this statement will also occur in the following chapters.¹²

adjustments and to eradicate the harmful ones (*op. cit.*, 262), though it is by no means an absolute criterion (*ibid.*, 352). McDougall: "Pleasure and pain are not in themselves springs of action, but at the most of undirected movements; they serve rather to modify the instinctive processes, pleasure tending to sustain and prolong any mode of action, pain to cut it short; under their prompting guidance are effected those modifications and adaptations of the instinctive bodily movements" (*Introduction to Social Psychology*, 43). Judd: "It is too abbreviated a form of statement to say in this case that the pleasure of success leads the mind to select the appropriate activity; the fact is rather that the pleasure comes because the selection has been successfully made in a natural way" (*Psy.*, 225). Fite: "The ethical consequence of the functional view is to render it inconceivable that we should choose pleasure as an end, and hence, impossible to set up pleasure as the end to be sought. According to the functional view, the motive power of action is instinct, and it is the object implied in the instinct which constitutes the end. In this system there is no room for the motive of pleasure. Pleasure is simply an abstracted phase of the process of satisfaction—an indication that the object is being attained in the presence of a difficulty. In other words, pleasure is not an active force or function, but a mere phenomenon. The desire for pleasure, if conceivable at all, would be irreconcilable with the desire for the object; for since pleasure exists only while success is deferred, pleasure as such could be prolonged only by sacrificing the object originally sought" ("The Place of Pleasure and Pain in the Functional Psychology," *Psy. Rev.*, X, 643-44).

¹² Also some of the more recent sociologists, who have largely or wholly abandoned the hedonistic criterion, still hold to subjectivistic and individualistic classifications of the springs of action, even though these classifications are for

What then is the actual part which feeling modes play in the causation of the act? To answer this question properly it will be necessary first to determine what part consciousness of any sort plays in such causation. Woodworth denies that imagery of any kind is necessary to setting off even a voluntary act, and contends that "the complete determinant of a voluntary motor act . . . is nothing less than the total set of the nervous system at the moment."¹³

It is not necessary here to enter into a discussion as to whether consciousness can be non-imaginal,¹⁴ but it must be admitted that the total cause of any act is more than the conscious part of it. When an idea or image precedes the act, i.e., when the neural pathway or the act runs through the cortex (as it must when there is considerable conflict and impediment to

the most part mere ornamenta which their authors do not seek or are unable to apply. (Cf. chap. iv, below, and A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government*, chap. vii.)

¹³ "[No] form of sensorial image of the movement or of its outcome need be present in consciousness in the moment just preceding the innervation. Imagery, kinaesthetic, tactile, visual, auditory, may or may not be present at the launching of a voluntary movement; when present, it seems, in many persons, at least, to be incidental rather than essential to the process."—Woodworth, *op. cit.*, 356.

"Where imagery is lacking, peripheral sensations are sometimes present in the field of attention, but after these cases are abstracted, there still remain a goodly share of the whole number [about one-fifth] . . . in whom no sensorial content could be detected."—*Ibid.*, 376.

"The complete determinant of a voluntary motor act—that which specifies exactly what act it shall be—is nothing less than the total set of the nervous system at the moment. The set is determined partly by factors of long standing, instincts and habits, partly by the sensations of the moment, partly by recent perceptions of the situation and by other thoughts lately present in consciousness; at the moment, however, these factors, though they contribute essentially to the set of the system, are for the most part present in consciousness only as a background or "fringe," if at all, while the attention is occupied by the thought of some particular change to be effected in the situation. The thought may be clothed in sensorial images—rags and tatters, or gorgeous raiment—but these are after all only clothes, and a naked thought [!] can perfectly well perform its function of starting the motor machinery in action and determining the point and object of its application."—*Ibid.*, 391-92.

¹⁴ For such a discussion see the above-mentioned monograph by Woodworth; also Titchener, *The Experimental Psychology of the Thought-Processes* (New York, 1910).

its overt expression), the act is termed voluntary. Because we are not able to determine the total set of the nervous system, we seize upon its most obvious and immediate sign, the percept or image, and call it the cause, though it is really only the sign of the whole act of which it is but a part. If the process of ideation be a long one, i.e., if the process by which an act finally gets overt expression is modified by a great many inhibitions occupying some appreciable extent of time, we term the subjective process *thinking*, and we speak of the thought as the cause of our activity, while it is only the sign or index of the whole act of which it is a part.

In the same way it has been customary to speak of feeling as the cause of activity, because we knew little or nothing of its neural correlates and because it is a very immediate experience. Feeling, however, is also but a sign of the whole act, and is even farther removed from the general causal process in its completeness than is the idea. As was above pointed out, pleasantness accompanies neural processes which supplement each other or which supplement the more stable, though lower, visceral and vegetative neural processes. Unpleasantness accompanies interference of processes, either of the higher sensory ones with each other or of these with the lower basic sets, when consciousness accompanies such nervous activity. Feeling modes then are resultants of internal neural adjustments or of internal neural interferences, which correlation probably is made in the cortex only when feeling is experienced. It is absurd to speak of these feeling modes as the cause of such neural relations, which go over into overt activity as acts in the common usage of that term, unless we do so in the sense that if there had not been such supplementation and interference or inhibition of processes (resulting at times in such feelings and also in more or less corresponding acts) we should have acted differently.¹⁵ But this is not an efficient and functional explanation of the act. It would be just as absurd also to say that feeling dictates causative ideas or dictates their recall in memory. The idea, like the act, can be accounted for only on the basis of the whole neural

¹⁵ Cf. Meyer, *Psy. Rev.*, XV, 319.

set. The feeling mode must be explained in terms of the correlation of parts of that set, of processes, with each other.

However, we can appeal from objective analysis and the experimental method to the evidence of introspection (though this sort of appeal is no longer in the best standing), and we may get a confirmation of the direct or indirect causal nature of feeling. Certainly introspection tells us that we frequently choose activities because we have reason to believe that they will afford pleasantness and avoid others because they usually give unpleasantness. This of course is all on the assumption that the idea of the thing can cause the act, which was discussed in the paragraph immediately preceding.¹⁶ It is generally held, however, that the feeling itself cannot be representative¹⁷ and thus cannot cause the act in the same way as the idea is supposed to be able to do. It is the idea of the act, which it is believed will result in certain feeling modes, that is supposed to be the cause of the representatively or ideationally caused or accompanied act.¹⁸ Introspection, then, tells us that we do frequently choose future activities with reference to whether they will be pleasant or unpleasant. And it also tells us that we perhaps at least as often choose activities without regard for or despite their provisioned feeling results. The introspective evidence is as valid in the one case as in the other.¹⁹

Accepting the introspective account and the introspective terminology, what activities may we say, then, are the result of feeling, in the sense that the perceived hedonic consequences of an act influence our choice of action and ends? It becomes

¹⁶ Cf. also notes 9, 10, and 11 above, this chapter.

¹⁷ Cf. Angell, *Psy.*, 266-67.

¹⁸ Cf. James, *op. cit.*, II, 580; Thorndike, *op. cit.*; also Ribot, *op. cit.*, 190: "A l'origine, le plaisir est un *effet*. . . . Plus tard, il devient une *cause* d'action."

¹⁹ This type of case where introspection tells us that we choose the pleasant act and avoid the unpleasant is not different from the supposed type of cases, abstracted by the older philosophers, in which pleasure and pain were spoken of as direct causes, except in the amount of time intervening between the stimulus and the response. In the latter type the choice and the feeling seem to be synchronous.

clear at once, as Marshall points out,²⁰ that a large number of unforeseen or stubborn circumstances interrupt the course of our mental and neural action and thus cause dissatisfaction. But allowing for these interruptions, in how far yet can we consciously seek pleasure and find it? The answer appears to be, In so far as we have the technique and ability for molding all objective social and physical processes and transformations to fit our immediate subjective ends and adjustments. That is, if we make the experience of pleasantness and the avoidance of unpleasantness the end of our endeavors, we can realize this end in so far as we can immediately and in the large control our environment. We must begin first to control our ideational and imaginal processes to this end. But this cannot be done most effectively without also controlling our physiological processes in the service of both ideation and feeling. Then, in the third place, we must be able to control our immediate environment in the form of material and social conditions, to which end the more narrowly "social" and financial conditions are to some degree essential. And fourthly, and least of all, we must be able to exert an effective though indirect control over the wider societary environment—at least enough to make sure of our immediate physiological and narrowly "social" adjustments.

This method is employed constantly with more or less success and with varying emphasis upon different details. Eastern voluptuaries and tyrants have tried it and have fairly succeeded—at least so long as they could control their adjustments as described above.²¹ Artists of all sorts have traditionally been accustomed to withdraw themselves into an esoteric world in which the chief assets of their happiness appear to be their reveries which go along with their "artistic temperaments," the

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, 350-51.

²¹ It has long been a custom of deposed monarchs, politicians, etc., to go into "retirement" and to assemble about them as much of their petty paraphernalia as possible and to piece out the situation by living on their memories. The Roman emperor Diocletian, who could not control his kingdom, took up cabbage raising and evidently would have been happy if he could have persuaded his rival to grow cabbages also.

reverence which the unsophisticated have for them, and non-interference from a world of fact. Indeed it has been asserted repeatedly by artists and litterateurs that genius is a lawless thing.²² Among the most successful devotees of this general method of securing pleasure and avoiding unpleasant experience, however unconscious the devotees may be of the philosophy of the method, are the women and men of fashion and pleasure. These are especially conspicuous in our modern world, where mechanical technique makes possible the accumulation of vast wealth and numerous accessories of personal satisfaction; but they were not lacking to earlier societies. The elaborate functions and social ceremonies of Rome were second only in the matter of refinement of adjustments to the social whirl and dissipation in modern Paris or any great European or American city.²³ Less striking examples can be found in the men with "hobbies" anywhere, the devotee of a game, the professional gambler, all types of hedonic amateurs, so long as these "hobbies," etc., remain personal penchants. Such satisfaction

²² Modern society appears quite confused as to whether this is the proper statement or whether it should be, Lawlessness is genius. Perhaps there is not enough difference between the two formulae to argue about.

²³ The details of the practice by which a modern woman of fashion lives a butterfly life of pleasures are too familiar from the literature of the time to require description here. Her thoughts are not arduous, but she takes the utmost care—by proxy—that there shall be no discord in them. A large part of her time is given to the luxurious care of her body—by others—and the remainder is divided between her clothes and fashionable functions or personal and sensuous gratifications, involving ceaseless change and inconstancy or anarchy of social purpose. Practically all the ordinary gross stimuli, such as light and color effects, sound, touch, taste, and odor, are carefully controlled for her. Customary morality in many cases drops out, especially in the realm of sexual experience, where social conformity would make inroads upon other pleasurable adjustments. Financial adjustments remain so much on the margin of her experience that they rarely come into her consciousness, except at a crisis in her career. The matter of her more narrowly "social" adjustments, the problem of retaining her prestige and of eliminating her "inferiors," perhaps disturbs her most. Such a picture has a feeble counterpart in the Greek and Roman courtesans (cf. DeCassagnac, *History of the Working Classes*, chap. xvii) and in the harems of the East of today. It is an extreme illustration, but it is not untrue to the facts, and is the nearest approach to perfect uninterrupted self-gratification that the modern and "strenuous" western world can boast.

is necessarily individualistic, and the more one's satisfactions become dependent upon a wider and more objective field of control the less invariably is one likely to be satisfied—at least under the present social order.

But the really social individual, in the broader sense, is not the one who acts with individual reference, that is, with the production of subjective or conscious states as his end. The person who attempts to understand the world and to work for efficient social control and expression is the one who operates with reference to social processes in the wide, whose end is the securing of a co-ordinated or social adjustment to nature or to the whole process of life, in whatever terms he may express his intent or in whatever manner he may act. He attempts to discover the conditions of the most effective social life and then to bring these conditions about and to adjust himself to them. The life and growth of the group, often of the broadest group, not his own individual happiness, not an economy of personal pleasantness and unpleasantness, become his criterion. While the hedonist begins by seeking to control his own mental and bodily processes in the interest of his personal satisfactions, the social individual, the one who has a scientific social criterion of conduct, rather than the socius *de facto*,²⁴ begins with group and race adjustment. As earlier pointed out, his criterion is social conservation rather than individual gratification. It cannot be said of such an individual either that he seeks pleasure or that he finds it in the largest or most constant measure, but that he is effective or functional in a progressively social world.

This type as such is just emerging. It had its forerunners in all those who caught glimpses of a civic spirit and rebelled against a narrow personal standard. The Stoics, the patriots of all ages, frequently the founders of religions, the advocates of divine right in government, the advocates of the theory of the moral sense and like doctrines, who sought to make authority

²⁴ All individuals are of course social in the question-begging sense that they exist in a world of people and were born with capacities for adjustment to that world (cf. Mead, *op. cit.*, and Houssay, *Rev. philosophique* [May, 1893], 475), but this does not necessarily signify that they are constructively or progressively social.

broader than mere individual whim and pleasure, are examples. But practically all of them remained personal and subjectivistic in their criteria. The self of the individual or of the deity or monarch was the final arbiter. Cases of asceticism or of self-torture of the kind indulged in by St. Simon Stylites were doubtless protests against a hedonistic order but were ineffective because they could not get away from a subjectivistic criterion and fix upon objective social service as a substitute. There was no conception and analysis of society which would permit of this substitution. The nearest approach to the modern type was the patriot who accepted the traditional spirit of his country or city as the inspiration of his cause. This was a collectivistic rather than an individualistic criterion, though not a scientifically determined criterion. The same collectivistic criterion can, of course, in some measure be attributed also to the absolutism of the priestly and political powers. But the modern socius is distinguished from the earlier in so far as he approaches to a scientific social criterion of conduct.

It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the truly social individual, because he does not seek pleasure or happiness, never experiences satisfaction.²⁵ In the first place no one is truly social in an inadequately social world. In an adequately controlled social world the results of seeking to further that control doubtless come more and more to be pleasurable. That is, one's habitual and conscious attitudes, based upon a knowledge of social facts and laws rather than upon mere conformity to the existing social order, regardless of what it may be on a wider view, on the one hand, and not upon self-gratification on the other hand, come to be less and less interrupted and broken down as the world becomes more completely and scientifically rather than whimsically socially controlled. Again, one may choose his activity with regard to the broader ends or more scientifically determined values of the group or social organism as a whole, because he sees in a particular case that such a

²⁵ The Stoics, Puritans, and other sects and factions appear to have pushed a general truth to the extreme in assuming that because the righteous or social individual cannot always be happy, it should be his constant endeavor never to be so or not to seem so.

course will also bring him more personal satisfaction. But, as social life and activities are now organized, at least, such coincidence of the wider and more far-reaching social good and his personal satisfaction does not often occur; and perhaps with man as he is—still largely a creature of early instinctive adjustments to conditions of race survival mainly on the level of the lower co-ordinations and processes—such coincidence can never be made complete.²⁶ The nearest approach to accomplishing such a thing is to control social activity in such a way and to such an extent that the desired habits can replace mere instinct and the fortuitously or wrongly acquired habits now dominant, when these conflict with the desired order. But this is necessarily an unpleasant task. It is further true that the consciousness of always working in a “good, even if hopeless” cause may react pleasurably upon the actor, and this is doubtless in the majority of cases a great sustaining factor. But if it is too much relied upon it is almost certain to turn one into the self-satisfied and dogmatic reformer who himself becomes a hedonist in the place of a social individual or true socius.²⁷

In addition to the conclusions drawn in connection with the discussion of the various theories of the cause of the act, further implications of primary importance which should be carried over from the present and preceding chapters for application to the subsequent discussion are: (1) that feeling is a purely individualistic and subjectivistic criterion of evaluation, (2) that feeling can be a cause of activity only when mental states or processes rather than objective social results are made the ends of attention and effort, (3) that pleasurable feeling can become attached to any activity regardless of the social or even individual value of that activity, and hence (4) that the sanction or evaluation of feeling upon conduct is worthless as a criterion of the individual or social utility of that conduct.

²⁶ “No proposition can be more palpably and egregiously false than the assertion that as far as this world is concerned it is invariably conducive to the happiness of a man to pursue the most virtuous career.”—Lecky, *History of European Morals* (New York, 1884), 61. Leslie Stephen takes the same view, though an advocate of the doctrine that all activity is caused by feeling. Cf. *Science of Ethics*, 433.

²⁷ Cf. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, 303.

IV. THEORIES OF THE END OF ACTIVITY

INTRODUCTION.—FROM HOBBS TO ROUSSEAU.—(1) SELF-GRATIFICATION AS END.—(2) FEELING HARMONIZED WITH CONTROL.—(3) THE TRANSITION TO EMPHASIS UPON SOCIAL CONTROL.—(4) THE NEO-UTILITARIANS OR SOCIAL ETHICISTS.—(5) OTHER SUBJECTIVISTIC THEORIES.—(6) THE TRANSITION TO SOCIOLOGY

It is the task of this chapter to enter into an account of typical views of the end of activity, tracing the line of development, so far as space will allow, through the various types of subjectivistic criteria in ethical and social writing to the present transition to a functional and objective sociology. The writers here treated, together with the views they represent, can be classified most conveniently under six heads. First are the frankly hedonistic theorists and agitators who regard pleasure, happiness, self-gratification as the legitimate end of all activity and abhor social control accordingly. This type may be illustrated by William Morris and Nietzsche. Closely related to these theorists in origin and growing up parallel and in close connection with them is another class of men who urge the same end of activity, but who do not conceive of the end as in any way opposed to legitimate and effective social control, but rather as an aid to it. Fourier and Bentham may be used to illustrate this type. Under the pressure of criticism Mill and Spencer and their contemporaries came to modify the bases of their doctrine of pleasure or happiness as the end; and their views furnish the material for the third division. After Mill and Spencer, and even contemporary with them, came a group of writers who may be called neo-utilitarians or social ethicists for lack of better terms. They make prominent the idea of reference to social control, but set up pleasure as the end or good, frequently displaying a poorly reconciled opposition between social morality and hedonic self-realization. These

writers constitute the fourth division. In the fifth division are classed the various subjectivistic theories centering about some other criterion than the "seeking of pleasure" and the "avoidance of pain," or at least implying such real or pseudo-facts as conscience, the moral sense, inner harmony, reason, self-realization, maximum activity, as the final objects of reference in activity. The final group of theorists is made up of the transitional sociologists, that is, those thinkers on social questions who were born into the old artificial subjectivism, but who are making the transition to a functional sociology. The line of transition through these types of theory will appear in the development of the chapter.

Hobbes, the father of modern English psychology and empirical philosophy, was also the unwitting progenitor of the modern democratic movement. On the one hand he started the analysis of mind in specific and concrete, almost objective, terms, which was carried on by Locke, Hume, Helvetius, Hartley, the Scottish school, and has lately appeared in the experimental psychology and realistic and pragmatic philosophy. On the other hand he gave a fruitful impulse to the discussion of the origin of authority in social control, which coming down through Locke, Helvetius,¹ Rousseau, Bentham, Fourier, Schiller, Babœuf, Weitling, Bakunin, and others, has permeated all the modern political and social discussion, though the content of the discussion has changed much in the transition. Hobbes stated the thesis that man renounced the state of nature which was also a state of freedom and of war, and accepted civilized life² con-

¹ Helvetius almost reproduces Hobbes (without citing him) in some parts of his writings, especially on the genesis of the social contract, his theory of feeling as a means of control, etc. (*op. cit.*, 322 ff.). I am convinced that a further study of Helvetius and his connections will show that he had a much wider influence in spreading the doctrines of Hobbes and his immediate successors than is now generally recognized.

² The term *civilized peoples*, in the sense of socially or state controlled peoples, appears in Helvetius (*op. cit.*, 292, 325) *policées peuples*, and in the German at a little later date as *polizierte Völker* (Professor Small has found the usage in Büsch, *op. cit.*), in each case used in the same sense, of people under coercive or compulsory control as a means to civilization. The same idea occurs again, though in much modified form, in the French school of sociologists in connection with the theory of the social organism (see below).

tractually as a means of escaping pain and suffering and of adding to his satisfactions.³ The hedonic motive which Hobbes put forth has furnished the basis of practically all later theories, and has not until very recently been modified.⁴ Locke made the first significant transition toward a theory of democracy on the new basis when he made the contract two-sided,⁵ while Rousseau went even farther in modifying the terms of the contract so as to make it wholly an expression of the popular will and dependent on nothing else.⁶ At this point Hobbes's germinal idea had blossomed into the green fruit of democracy, and we need not at this point trace the connection farther.

Rousseau, however, reversed one of the principles of Hobbes in giving form to the theory that man made a mistake in coming out of the state of nature, which according to Rousseau was not a state of war as Hobbes had described it, but a state of peace, happiness, and innocence.⁷ True to the poetic tradition⁸ he had his golden age in the past. As the formulator of this view Rousseau became the father of modern philosophic anarchism. With the best of evidence the nihilistic doctrines of

³ *Leviathan*, *loc. cit.*, chaps. xiii-xiv.

⁴ The scattered adherents of a theocratic doctrine of the origin of social control would, of course, accept the hedonic statement of the origin of social control with reservations or reject it entirely (Paley combines the idea of revelation and the pleasure and pain motive—the "fear of hell"—in control. Cf. *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, Bk. I, chap. vi; Bk. II, chaps vi-viii; also Martineau, *op. cit.*, II, 234. Sidgwick classes Paley as a utilitarian because of this attitude. Cf. *Hist. of Ethics* (3d ed.), 238 ff. Mill strongly resents this characterization. Cf. "Professor Sidgwick's Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge" in *Dissertations and Discussions* (Boston, 1868), I, 150. But the theocratic theorists are negligible. The dominant line of development of the theory of social control has been, of course, in modern times from the contract theory of Hobbes down to the completest evolutionary and naturalistic statement of the theory of the present.

⁵ Cf. Locke's *Second Treatise on Government*, Bk. II, chap. viii.

⁶ Cf. *The Social Contract* (transl. Harrington), Bk. I, chaps. vi-vii; Bk. IV, chap. i.

⁷ Cf. *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité*, especially the Preface. Morellet (*Le code de la nature*, 1755) expresses about the same view, in a more crude way.

⁸ Rousseau was not, of course, a scientist, but a popularizer and a sentimentalist.

Bakunin, which have both directly and indirectly so strongly influenced modern pseudo-social and literary writing, and hence popular thinking, have been traced back to him.⁹ Socialism also as a part of the general modern democratic movement owes much to Rousseau.¹⁰ It is to the more anarchistic and to the socialistic variants which are traceable to Rousseau that the first group of examples in this chapter belongs, while the other groups, with a partial exception for the second, come for the most part within the limits of the more conventional movement of democracy.

I. (William Morris takes happiness and democratic gratification to be the criterion of the end of life and action,¹¹ and for its attainment all social revolution or change must occur.¹² Government stands in the way of the attainment of this end.¹³ He rebels even at the idea of a coercive public opinion,¹⁴ and holds that pleasure from the satisfaction of natural desires is the proper guide to conduct.¹⁵ Crime does not require punishment, for "In a society where there is no punishment to evade, no law to triumph over, remorse will certainly follow transgression."¹⁶ His ideal of life is a non-coercive communism where the love of

⁹ Cf. Graham, *Socialism New and Old*, 67-68. Ibsen confesses to inspiration from Bakunin, and G. B. Shaw asserts his discipleship to Ibsen. Cf. *The Quintessence of Ibsenism*.

¹⁰ Graham, *op. cit.*, 59 ff.

¹¹ *News from Nowhere* (Boston, 1890), 80.

¹² *Ibid.*, 128.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 104. Also: "It would be possible for us to contend with and rob each other, but it would be harder for us than refraining from strife and robbery. That is, in short, the foundation of our life and happiness."—*Ibid.*, 110.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 82.

¹⁵ In describing how the old order failed, Old Hammond said: "[Most crimes] were the result of the laws of private property, which forbade the satisfaction of their natural desires to all but a privileged few, and of the general visible coercion which came of those laws. . . . Again, many violent acts came from the artificial perversion of the sexual passions, which caused over-weening jealousy and the like miseries [also based on the man-made idea of woman as property]. That idea has of course vanished with private property, as well as certain follies about the "ruin" of women for following their natural desires in an illegal way, which was, of course, a convention caused by the laws of private property."—*Ibid.*, 112.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 114.

work will be a sufficient bond.¹⁷ His ideal of "real learning" is "knowledge cultivated for its own sake—the Art of Knowledge, in short."¹⁸

Nietzsche in a way returns to the basic principle of Hobbes, in declaring that the focus of all activities and ends is in a desire to escape suffering, "in a longing for *stupefaction of pain through emotion*."¹⁹ This suffering is age-long, generally recognizable in the *feeling of guilt* which has its origin in "a bit of animal psychology—no more."²⁰ The relief from this unpleasant feeling is the exercise of the instinct of the *will to power*.²¹ The ascetic priesthood have always studied to repress this "instinct" and to deepen the feeling of guilt, thus robbing mankind of happiness.²² Modern science is the ally of the priesthood in this theft of happiness.²³ The only hope for humanity is in breaking away from both, in exalting the egoistic *blond beast*, and then the hobgoblin "morality will die." He looks for this transformation within the next two hundred years.²⁴

II. Charles Fourier was in large measure the prototype of theorists like William Morris and was a follower of Rousseau and Helvetius, especially in so far as the doctrine that pleasure

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 127. Also: "... Those more enlightened men who were then [under the old order] called Socialists, although they well knew, and even stated in public, that the only reasonable condition of society was that of pure communism (such as you now see around you), yet shrunk from what seemed to them the barren task of preaching the realization of a happy dream."—*Ibid.*, 145.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹⁹ *A Genealogy of Morals* (transl. Hausmann, New York, 1897), 176. Plato, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, all regarded pleasure as cessation of pain or discomfort, as does Nietzsche here. Cf. Wright, *op. cit.*, VI, 72-91.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 196. Elsewhere he explains the origin of this "feeling" differently: "The feeling of guilt . . . and of personal obligation has . . . its origin in the oldest and most primitive personal relationship which ever existed—the relationship between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor."—*Ibid.*, 82-83.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 188 ff. Technically, Nietzsche does not make feeling or happiness the end of action, but substitutes the criterion of *will to power*. But since he understands by pleasure a feeling of increased power and by pain a feeling of diminished power, his criterion resolves itself finally into a simple hedonistic subjectivistic statement of the end of activity. (Cf. *Werke*, XIII, 254, 271 ff.; XV, 323, 331 ff.)

²² *Genealogy of Morals*, 190 ff.

²³ *Ibid.*, 214-15.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 225.

is the end of action is concerned. However, he believed in a form of social control, meager in scope though the control was to be. For him the law of happiness is to social science what the law of gravitation is to physics.²⁵ He held that the instincts and impulses are naturally good and that the way to happiness is to follow them.²⁶ Therefore it is necessary to study these impulses or attractions coming from nature instead of the artificial duties recommended by the philosophers.²⁷ He recognizes that to follow the lead of our sensuous appetites (to which he mainly refers)²⁸ may get us into trouble, but that is only because our social organization is such as it is, and with the proper social reorganization this disturbance would be removed. Hence the necessity for instituting the system of the phalanstery.²⁹ One of the incidents of the change in social control which he urges

²⁵ Cf. *Théorie des quatre mouvements*, 107 (2d ed., *Œuvres*, Paris, 1846). Compare Helvetius, *op. cit.*, 322; also Lester F. Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 55, 94, and *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 486-87.

²⁶ "L'attraction passionnée est l'impulsion donnée par la nature antérieurement à la réflexion, et persistante malgré l'opposition de la raison, du devoir, du préjugé, etc."—*Nouveau monde industriel et sociétaire*, *Œuv.* (2d ed.), 47.

"Le monde savant est tout imbu d'une doctrine appelée MORALE, qui est mortelle ennemie de l'attraction passionnée. La morale enseigne à l'homme à être en guerre avec lui-même, résister à ses passions, les réprimer, croire que Dieu n'a pas su organiser sagement nos âmes, nos passions; qu'il avait besoin des leçons de Platon et Sénèque pour apprendre à distribuer les caractères et les instincts. Imbu de ces préjugés sur l'impéritie de Dieu, le monde savant était inhabile au calcul des impulsions naturelles ou attractions passionnées, que la morale proscriit et relégue au rang des vices."—*Ibid.*, 125 (quoted from Gide, *Charles Fourier: Œuvres choisies*, 11).

"Les passions qu'on croit ennemies de la concorde ne tendent qu'à cette unité dont nous les jugeons si éloignées."—Gide, *op. cit.*, 12.

²⁷ "Tous ces caprices philosophiques, appelés *des devoirs*, n'ont aucun rapport avec la nature; le devoir vient des hommes, l'attraction vient de Dieu; or, si l'on veut connaître les vues de Dieu, il faut étudier l'attraction, la nature seule, sans aucune acception du devoir qui varie dans chaque siècle, tandis que la nature des passions a été et restera invariable chez tous les peuples."—*Théorie des quatre mouvements*, 107 (from Gide, *op. cit.*, 10). Compare on the matter of duty G. B. Shaw, *Quintessence of Ibsenism* (New York, 1904), 44-45.

²⁸ See his classifications, *Nouveau monde industriel et sociétaire* (*Œuvres*, *loc. cit.*), 47 ff.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 99 ff. See also Gide, *op. cit.*, 13.

is that women should be sexually free at the age of eighteen.³⁰ The wide influence of Fourier after his death is well known. In 1841 Considérant lectured at Dijon,³¹ on the prospects of Fourierism and "there was loud and prolonged applause among an enthusiastic audience."³²

Bentham was much less radical and visionary than Fourier. His line of theoretical descent is direct from Hobbes down through Locke and Hume, both of whom held to the theory that the seeking of pleasure and the avoidance of pain constitute the ends of activity.³³ From them also he got his empirical philosophy and largely his practical bent of mind which led him to seek to apply his principles in common-sense legislation, or rather to seek a philosophy of motivation to justify and explain his practical measures. He desired exactness. Though less influenced by continental than by English thought, he and Fourier held much the same views about happiness.³⁴ Though Bentham regards "pleasure and pain" as constituting the sole motives of life,³⁵ he recognizes that they need some social control, some selection and direction, and in this he advances beyond Fourier and his type of thinkers.³⁶ As a guide to such selection

³⁰ Cf. *Théorie des quatre mouvements*, loc. cit., 197.

³¹ The Academy of Dijon had given Rousseau a prize in 1750.

³² Kaufmann, *Utopias*, 82.

³³ Cf. Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, chap. xx; and Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. II, Part III, sec. 3.

³⁴ Fourier says of Bentham: "Je n'ai vu qu'un écrivain civilisé qui ait un peu approché de la définition du vrai bonheur; c'est M. Bentham, exigé des réalités et non des illusions: tout les autres sont si loin du but, qu'ils ne sont pas dignes de critique."—*Nouveau monde industriel et sociétaire*, loc. cit., 348.

³⁵ "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think. . . . The principle of utility (*greatest happiness* or *greatest felicity*) recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law."—*Prin. of Morals and Legislation*, 1.

³⁶ "Pleasures, then, and the avoidance of pains are the *ends* which the legislator has in view. It behoves him, therefore, to understand their *value*. Pleasures

he makes an elaborate classification of pleasures and pains on the ultimate basis of intensity of feeling,³⁷ and later of the different degrees of susceptibility of different people.³⁸ Aside from his hedonistic doctrine he takes a fairly objective and scientific view of the causation and social value of the act.³⁹ His theory of feeling is for him only a method; his object is social control and betterment.

III. The significant additions made to the theory of utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill⁴⁰ are (1) that he develops the concept of quality in happiness,⁴¹ by which term he understands pleasure and the absence of pain;⁴² (2) that he emphasizes less the negative side of avoidance of suffering, thus giving the impression of a higher conception to his theory; (3) that he conceives the happiness which is desirable to be not that of the individual alone, but primarily that of society or of the greatest number;⁴³ and (4) that he justifies this wider reference of the principle of happiness on the grounds of an acquired conscience and the development of the social feelings of mankind.⁴⁴ It is in these additions that we find him preparing the way for the

and pains are the *instruments* he has to work with; it behoves him, therefore, to understand their force, which is again, in another point of view, their value."—*Ibid.*, 16.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 16 ff.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 21 ff.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁴⁰ The justification for making a separate division for Mill and Spencer as representatives of a tendency of thought may be doubted. They have their place because they represent a radical transition in social and ethical theory. Both had encyclopedic minds, such as transitional periods require of their leaders. Mill's, because of his training, was a mirror for all the information and theory of the past toward which he always turned sympathetically. Even his arguments for the emancipation of women and for greater liberty are platonic on the one hand and Eighteenth Century on the other. Spencer's training in natural science and his wealth of ill-digested, but modern, social facts on the other hand, led him to look resolutely to the future and frequently to deny his obvious indebtedness to the past, to formally espouse the doctrine of evolution which he endeavored to apply to ethics and sociology, arriving however in the main only at classification. Both were in fact utilitarians; the one an apologist for the utilitarian theories on old logical grounds, and the other unconsciously giving them a new lease of life through the application of biological and sociological arguments and analogies.

⁴¹ *Utilitarianism* (11th ed.), 11 ff.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 16, 24.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 25, 41.

socio-ethicists and neo-utilitarians to be considered in the next section.]

Spencer maintained that the utilitarian criterion, greatest happiness, either for the individual or for the group, is unmeasurable,⁴⁵ and asserts that happiness, the legitimate end of action, must be sought indirectly by fulfilling the social conditions of (1) equal justice, (2) negative beneficence, (3) positive beneficence, and (4) pursuance of individual happiness or pleasure.⁴⁶ His main contribution, however, is that he modified the original utilitarian principle, making society the constant term in adjustment and the individual the relative.⁴⁷ In this practical negation of his happiness standard he gives a distinct impetus to an objective and social as opposed to an individualistic criterion. In his *Principles of Ethics*, however, he reaffirms this hedonic criterion,⁴⁸ and finally brings in sympathy—or sympathetic gratification—to harmonize the opposition between social control and hedonic self-gratification or realization.⁴⁹ To support his theory

⁴⁵ *Social Statics* (American ed.), 8 ff.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 33 ff.

⁴⁷ "The social state is a necessity. The conditions to the greatest happiness under the state are fixed. Our characters are the only things not fixed. They, then, must be moulded into fitness for the conditions. And all moral teaching and discipline must have for its object to hasten this process."—*Ibid.*, 35. It would not be impossible however to put a similar construction upon the teachings of Bentham and other utilitarian writers, especially if they had possessed an adequate conception of the essentially unitary nature of society—which they did not.

⁴⁸ " . . . No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inextinguishable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition."—*Op. cit.* (American ed.), I, 46.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 255. This method of extending the conception of the content of pleasurable experience had also been practiced at a much earlier date by those moralists who sought in the feelings a criterion of evaluation of activities which would relieve them of the necessity of reference to religious or political absolutism as criteria, and who were at the same time unable to conceive of an objective social criterion. Cf. Hartley, "Of the Six Classes of Intellectual Pleasures and Pains," *Observations on Man* (4th ed.), Part I, chap. iv. See also Wright, *op cit.*, 31 ff.

he resuscitates the principle that pleasantness and unpleasantness accompany useful and harmful actions respectively,⁵⁰ but clothes the statement in evolutionary language.⁵¹ To this he adds the principle that pleasure can be made to accompany any activity not inconsistent with the maintenance of life,⁵² and concludes that sympathy and altruism will ultimately be made pleasurable by society, hence happiness or pleasure will be the effective as well as the natural guide.⁵³ He emphasizes the view that the emotions or feelings (used by him indifferently) "are the masters, the intellect the servant,"⁵⁴ a principle later made so much of by Lester F. Ward. In Spencer we see, distinctly, signs of the future as well as of the past. Through him utilitarianism ceased to be merely logical and became "evolutionary," thus getting a new lease on life. Spencer marks the second stage in an acute transition of which Mill was the first stage.

IV. Contemporary with and subsequent to Spencer, a new school of ethicists arose, which may be called the social school, and which has acted as a sort of link between the old utilitarianism and other types of subjectivism on the one hand and the rising school of sociology on the other. In fact, Spencer himself belongs to this school, and was in no small sense its founder, as he has been to a considerable extent a contributor to most recent related disciplines. The guiding principle of this whole school may be found in Leslie Stephen as well as another, when he traces morality back to social conditions.⁵⁵ And he does this despite the fact that he holds to the Benthamite doctrine that "conduct . . . is determined by feeling," even by

⁵⁰ Cf. chap. iii, above.

⁵¹ Cf. *Principles of Ethics*, I, 79; and *Prin. of Psy.*, I, sec. 124, 279, 280 ff.

⁵² *Prin. of Ethics*, I, 186.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, I, 302.

⁵⁴ "Feeling versus intellect" in *Facts and Comments* (American ed.), 38, 43.

⁵⁵ "Morality . . . is a product of the social factor; the individual is moralized through his identification with the social organism [cf. Spencer and the modern French organicists]; the conditions, therefore, of the security of morality are the conditions of the persistence of society; and if we ask from the scientific point of view what these conditions are, we can only reply by stating that the race is dependent upon the environment; by tracing, so far as we are able, the conditions under which it has been developed, and trying to foresee the future from the past."—*Science of Ethics*, 454.

present feeling and not by mere representation.⁵⁶ Like Spencer he assumes the agreement of social and of individual welfare, of life and happiness, but finds the assumption difficult to reconcile with the facts;⁵⁷ so, like Spencer again, he bridges the chasm by the introduction of altruism and sympathy.⁵⁸

According to Green also "the true good is, and in its earliest form was, a social good," in which self and others are not to be distinguished.⁵⁹ This good is not a succession of pleasures but of objects which, when realized, contribute equally to the satisfaction of the "permanent self" and of society.⁶⁰ Though of a different intellectual derivation, he is, however, strongly influenced by the prevailing utilitarian ideas, and his disagreement with the utilitarians on the subject of feeling appears more imagined than real.⁶¹ Sidgwick, however, finds two ends or goods, "Happiness and Perfection or Excellence of human nature—meaning here by 'excellence' not primarily superiority to others, but a partial realization of, or approximation to, an ideal type of human perfection."⁶² In a criticism of Spencer,

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 42, 47. He is closer to Bentham on this point even than Mill is. He says: "Pain and pleasure are the sole and ultimate causes [of activity]." —*Ibid.*, 50.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 432.

⁵⁸ "Therefore it may be, or rather plainly is, necessary for a man to acquire certain instincts [*sic*], among them the altruistic instincts, which fit him for the general conditions of life, though in particular cases they may cause him to be more miserable than if he were without them."—*Ibid.*, 433.

⁵⁹ Cf. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sec. 232.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, secs. 234 ff.

⁶¹ "According to our theory the human perfection identified with ultimate good is a 'state of desirable consciousness,' though not simply a state of pleasure; and pleasure is anticipated in the attainment of the desired end, though it is not the end desired."—*Ibid.* (explanatory analysis), sec. 364. Again: "According to Mr. Sidgwick's theory, on the other hand, desirable consciousness is the same as pleasure, and his Universalistic Hedonism (differing from the older Utilitarianism) seems to rest on the position that reason pronounces ultimate good to be desirable consciousness or pleasure, and, further, universal pleasure."—*Ibid.*, sec. 365. The difference here seems to be merely formal. All this is essentially the same old subjectivistic philosophy in which the emphasis was always upon mental states instead of upon objective results.

⁶² *Methods of Ethics*, 9.

however, he appears to reduce the two ends to one.⁶³ H. Rashdall, a student of both Green and Sidgwick, takes an eclectic position, adopting the happiness end of the latter,⁶⁴ and making the combined social and intuitional reference of the former the criterion for selection among impulses contending for satisfaction.⁶⁵

Two contemporary social ethicists, who may be classed as neo-utilitarians, are Frederick Meakin and Professor Dewey. Meakin takes very frankly the view that pleasure or the idea of experience which is pleasurable is the sole motive in conscious choice.⁶⁶ From this view he makes a quick transition to the idea of the essentially social nature of morality,⁶⁷ and bridges the chasm with the social instinct [*sic*] which "pervades all our instincts," but which he cannot quite conceive of as innate.⁶⁸ This contradiction throws him back upon a long discussion of the question, "Does morality demand of the individual uncompensated [in the sense of unpleasurable feeling] sacrifice?"⁶⁹ The possession of a candid mind leads him ultimately to take refuge in religious values and something more than temporal reward to avoid an affirmative answer.⁷⁰ Except for this final refuge his theory does not differ essentially from that of Spencer or Stephen.

Dewey on the other hand stands with Green in denying that pleasure can be the cause of an act,⁷¹ and distinguishes happiness from pleasure, making the former a social matter rather than individual.⁷² But social interests are something

⁶³ He says: "We both agree that the greatest happiness of the aggregate of persons affected by actions is the ultimate end."—*Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau*, 278.

⁶⁴ *Theory of Good and Evil*, II, 60; I, 100.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 100, 180.

⁶⁶ *Op. cit.*, 90 and chap. x. Meakin may be taken as the most consistent modern exponent of utilitarian theory.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, chaps. xi and xiv.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 131.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, chap. xxviii.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, chaps. xxiii ff.

⁷¹ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, 269-71.

⁷² "The genuinely moral person . . . will find his happiness or satisfaction in the promotion of these [associational] activities irrespective of the particular pains or pleasures that accrue."—*Ibid.*, 298.

broader than sympathy, which he regards as "a genuine natural instinct," and by means of which he finds himself unable to reconcile the contradiction which had troubled earlier writers.⁷³ "What is required is a *blending*, a *fusing* of the sympathetic tendencies with the other impulsive and habitual traits of the self."⁷⁴ With "sympathy transformed into a habitual standpoint" the self becomes moral,⁷⁵ and the persons who have most of this are happiest, or at least have the "best" happiness.⁷⁶ He assumes that all men love happiness in the sense that they wish to realize their desires,⁷⁷ and he also assumes the identity of "true" individual happiness with the social happiness as the condition of their realizing their desires for happiness.⁷⁸ On this basis he enters in conclusion a plea for a voluntary democracy.⁷⁹ Thus Dewey also stands on practically the same ground as do Spencer, Stephen, and Meakin, and like them diverges only formally from John Stuart Mill.

V. Contemporary with the various writers mentioned here were also a number of other writers who held to various other

⁷³ *Ibid.* See also secs. 3 and 4, this chapter.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 299.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 300. Is this different from the "good will" of Kant?

⁷⁶ "To those in whom it [the moral interest] is the supreme interest it brings supreme or final happiness. It is not preferred because it is the greater happiness, but in being preferred as expressing the only kind of self which the agent fundamentally wishes himself to be, it constitutes a kind of happiness with which others cannot be compared. It is unique, final, invaluable."—*Ibid.*, 301. Also: "Regard for their final happiness (i.e., for a happiness whose *quality* is such that it cannot be *externally* added to or subtracted from) demands that these others shall find the controlling objects of preference, resolution, and endeavor in the things that are worth while."—*Ibid.*, 302-3.

In the first of the above excerpts, Dewey appears to be confused between "most" and "best", as well as to have given up the individualistic test of pragmatism. In the second, he leaves us to guess what are the things "worth while," nor does he tell us who selects them. If the individual selects them, they never agree for different people, and if some social authority selects them the admission of this fact disrupts his autonomous theory of ethics and of democracy.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 274.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 301-2. This second assumption is the one which gave Spencer, Stephen, and others so much difficulty.

⁷⁹ "There is no way to escape or evade this law of happiness, that it resides in the exercise of the active capacities of a voluntary agent; and hence no way to escape or evade the law of a common happiness, that it must reside in the congruous exercise of the voluntary activities of all concerned."—*Ibid.*, 304.

subjectivistic criteria than that of feeling, though in various instances they accepted feeling as the force impelling to action.⁸⁰ All of these doctrines are essentially intuitionistic rather than empirical. (1) Perhaps the most generally accepted of all of them has been that of *reason* as an underived criterion. and to this principle in some of its forms Kant, Green, Cudworth, Clark, Calderwood,⁸¹ and others were adherents. (2) *Conscience* or the innate *moral sense* was accepted as criterion by such men as Hume, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Butler, Lecky, Lotze, Martineau, and Westermarck.⁸² (3) Closely allied to this is the *harmony* view of S. H. Hodgson,⁸³ Fichte, and others. (4) A similar theory is the *self-realization* doctrine of Paulsen, Mackenzie,⁸⁴ Bradley, W. G. Sumner, and which is held to in some form and degree by a large number of social and ethical writers. (5) Another view which has had some acceptance is the "moral principle of maximum activity" emphasized by Simmel,⁸⁵ Nietzsche, and others. This view, which makes mere action the end, has had a considerable vogue in recent polite literature especially of the type of Browning.

VI. It is necessary, finally, to relate the beginnings of functional sociology to the general line of development which has been under consideration. Sociology as a theoretical discipline has so far been largely classificational, placing major emphasis

⁸⁰ Cf. Wright, *op. cit.*, 43 ff.

⁸¹ "Reason itself supplies the principles of rectitude, which cannot be reached by induction from experience, as all rules of expediency are."—*Philos. Rev.* (July, 1896), 338.

⁸² "That the moral concepts are ultimately based on emotions either of indignation or approval, is a fact which a certain school of thinkers have in vain attempted to deny. . . . Men pronounced certain acts to be good or bad on account of the emotions those acts [instinctively] aroused in their minds, just as they called sunshine warm or ice cold on account of certain sensations which they experienced, and as they named a thing pleasant or painful because they felt pleasure or pain."—*Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, I, 4.

⁸³ "Volitions, therefore, when judged practically, are judged by the anticipated harmony or discord which they tend to produce in the character of the agent."—*Metaphysic of Experience*, 66.

⁸⁴ "If we have any rational end at all it must consist in some kind of realization of our nature as a whole."—*Introd. to Social Philosophy*, 255.

⁸⁵ *Einleitung in die Moralkwissenschaft* (Berlin, 1892), Bd. I, S. 388.

upon the so-called psychical "social forces." Hobbes, it was seen,⁸⁶ had a classification of the "appetites" and "aversions" and various supplementary mental subdivisions, which may be termed social, as well as individual, forces. Fourier made an elaborate though crude classification of the passions or "social forces" to which he desired to give free play in solving the problems of society.⁸⁷ Spencer devoted most of his attention to collecting and classifying real or pseudo facts about primitive society, and very little to a theory of the application of those facts to present social problems. That he was not unmindful of the practical demand, however, is shown by his classification of the criteria for action in *Social Statics*, referred to above.⁸⁸ His final criterion, however, reduces itself to happiness, or satisfaction of the emotions or feelings, as end, in which arrangement the intellect plays the rôle of "servant."

Lester F. Ward's first book, *Dynamic Sociology*, was practically an amplification of this ultimate criterion of Spencer, with a great deal of emphasis upon the efficiency of the "servant."⁸⁹ The views of both Spencer and Ward, as well as of other earlier writers, as to the nature of the "social forces" or conscious ends of social activity are thus seen to be subjectivistic and individualistic, quite in keeping with the spirit of their times and of the philosophy from which they learned. According to Ward, "The problem of social science is to point out in what way the most complete and universal satisfaction of human desires can be attained, and this is one with the prob-

⁸⁶ Cf. above, chap iii; also *Leviathan*, *loc. cit.*, 41 ff.

⁸⁷ Cf. chap. iv, sec. 11.

⁸⁸ Chap. iv, sec. 3.

⁸⁹ In this book Ward classifies the social forces as follows: A. Happiness, the ultimate end of connation; B. Progress; C. Dynamic Action; D. Dynamic Opinion; E. Knowledge; F. Education, the initial means of securing the ultimate end. Cf. *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 108-9. In his latest work he rearranges this classification somewhat, but the idea is essentially the same. The later classification is: I. Physical Forces (function bodily)—1. Ontogenetic Forces—(1) positive, attractive (seeking pleasure); (2) negative, protective (avoiding pain); 2. Phylogenetic Forces—(1) direct, sexual; (2) indirect, consanguineal. II. Spiritual Forces (function psychic)—1. Sociogenetic Forces—(1) moral (seeking the safe and good); (2) aesthetic (seeking the beautiful); (3) intellectual (seeking the useful and true).—*Pure Sociology*, 261.

lem of the greatest happiness.”⁹⁰ He appraises happiness in terms of the number and rank of the wants satisfied. His definition and placing of sociology show clearly his intellectual “inheritance” from Comte and even from Hobbes.⁹¹

Winiarski has gone to the metaphysically ridiculous in attempting to establish an identity between biologic energy and feeling consciousness, thus reducing “egoism” and “altruism” to actual social forces, akin to the physical forces, which will enable us to formulate an exact science of sociology.⁹² He quotes liberally from English and American and other writers closely connected with the movement outlined here.⁹³

Ross, in formulating his own classification of the “social forces,”⁹⁴ makes a semi-apology for differing somewhat from Ward.⁹⁵ He, like the other classificationists of this group, is

⁹⁰ *Psychic Factors in Civilization*, 74. Again: “The problem of dynamic sociology is the *organization of happiness*.”—*Dynamic Sociology*, II, 156.

⁹¹ “Considering activities as motions, the forces producing those motions are the desires, and we have a science which may be called mental physics or *psychics*. It constitutes the dynamic department of psychology and may also be called the dynamics of mind. . . .

“1. The object of Nature is Function; 2. The object of Man is Happiness; 3. The object of Society is Action. . . .

“Treating human action as social motion, the forces producing this motion are the desires, and we have a science which may be called social physics. It constitutes the dynamic department of sociology or *dynamic sociology* in the primary sense of that term, the department which treats of the social forces.”—*Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 129, 130. Compare Hobbes, *op. cit.*, 41 ff., and Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, *loc. cit.*, Bk. VI.

⁹² “L'égoïsme et l'altruisme sont les deux manifestations élémentaires de l'énergie biologique, comme l'attraction et la répulsion le sont de l'énergie cosmique. . . . L'énergie biologique est dirigée dans chaque individu et dans chaque groupe d'individus par la tendance au maximum de plaisir ou de bonheur possible.”—*Rev. philosophique*, XLV, 352–53. Winiarski, even more than Ward, is reactionary and is included here merely as illustrative of a type which tends to survive.

⁹³ His chief inspiration appears to have come from Edgeworth's mathematical applications to social subjects. Cf. *ibid.*, 353.

⁹⁴ In outline, the classification is: I. Natural Desires—(a) appetitive, (b) hedonic, (c) egotic, (d) affective, (e) recreative; II. Cultural Desires—(f) religious, (g) ethical, (h) aesthetic, (i) intellectual. Cf. *Foundations of Sociology*, 169.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 167.

convinced that "the cornerstone of sociology must be a sound doctrine of the social forces,"⁹⁶ which he, like the others, regards as essentially and ultimately psychic.⁹⁷ He distinguishes *desires* and *interests* as referring to conscious or individual and to social activities respectively,⁹⁸ certainly a step in the right direction. One among the many writers who do not see this difference is Stuckenberg,⁹⁹ whose classification of the "social forces" does not otherwise differ greatly from that of Ross.

Ratzenhofer also has failed to make this elementary distinction and consequently classifies the various motives and desires under terms which are purely abstractions.¹⁰⁰ His view of the expansion of the more general from the more special interests is not unlike the metaphysical derivation of the later writer Winiarski mentioned above.¹⁰¹

In Small's classification of the "social forces" the "interests" are also in effect abstractions or forms,¹⁰² but beneath these forms lurk the original "social forces," the concrete conscious desires and impulses. Even here, where the form of the classification has a social reference, the content is lodged in the individual consciousness as the source of activities.¹⁰³ In other words, one of the most objective of all these classifications of

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 160-61.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁹⁹ Stuckenberg's classification is: I. Fundamental, (1) economic, (2) political; II. Constitutional, (3) egotic, (4) appetitive, (5) affectional, (6) recreative; III. Cultural, (7) aesthetic, (8) ethical, (9) religious, (10) intellectual. Cf. *Sociology*, I, 207.

¹⁰⁰ He classifies under the term *interests* as follows: (1) race, (2) physiological, (3) egotic, (4) social, (5) transcendental (*Sociologische Erkenntnis*, S. 54 *passim*).

¹⁰¹ *Op. cit.*, *Rev Philosophique*, xlv, 363 ff.

¹⁰² The terms in the classification are: Health, Wealth, Sociability, Knowledge, Beauty, Rightness. Cf. *General Sociology*, 198. He defines the interest: "In general, an interest is an unsatisfied capacity corresponding to an unrealized condition, and it is predisposition to such rearrangement as would tend to realize the indicated condition. . . . Human interests, then, are the ultimate terms of calculation in sociology. The whole life-process, so far as we know it, whether viewed in its individual or in its social phase, is at last the process of developing, adjusting, and satisfying interests."—*Ibid.*, 433-34.

¹⁰³ ". . . These interests . . . are the motors of all individual and social action."—*Ibid.*, 435.

the "social forces" does not get away from final subjectivistic reference. Like the others, it is finally subjectivistic and individualistic.¹⁰⁴ "In the beginning," he says, "were interests,"¹⁰⁵ implying that these internal impulses and desires are the fundamental and original facts in social life. Almost immediately, however, he introduces the factors of physical and social environment into the situation and mentions them in advance of the interests;¹⁰⁶ and a little farther on he appears to forget the matter of subjective social forces altogether in urging a concrete analysis and classification of the whole social process.¹⁰⁷ The explanation is, of course, that he is divided between two systems or methods of sociology, the logical subjectivistic-individualistic, coming over from his contact with the earlier social and ethical theorists like Mill, Green, Spencer, and Ward, and an objective method derived from his actual observation of and participation in the social process. The problem of harmonizing the two methods does not present itself as urgent, for it has been the custom of the subjective classificationists, their classifications once achieved and proven logically satisfactory, to pigeon-hole them and to appeal to objective common-sense methods when they had really practical work to do.¹⁰⁸

It is perhaps significant that an economist of great reputa-

¹⁰⁴ In a public lecture before the University of Chicago, May 13, 1910, Professor Small declared that "human valuations are the efficient social forces." He further stated that the valuations of men are to be compared with gravity in the physical world, though they cannot be measured as accurately as the latter, because they shift centers.

¹⁰⁵ *General Sociology*, 196.

¹⁰⁶ "All men, however, from the most savage to the most highly civilized, act as they do act, first, because of variations in the circumstances of their environment, both physical and social; second, because of variations and permutations of their six elementary interests."—*Ibid.*, 197-98.

¹⁰⁷ "Positive knowledge of the social process must depend upon the use of methods which avoid both of these vices [limited induction and the *a priori* method]. It is necessary, on the one hand, to analyze concrete conditions. It is necessary, on the other hand, to interpret each and every concrete condition by locating it perfectly in the whole social process."—*Ibid.*, 226.

¹⁰⁸ De Greef also has a classification of social elements or forces (cf. *Introduction à la Sociologie*, II, 15), a classification, though based upon an abstraction, which avoids some of the worst errors of subjectivism.

tion, who welcomes the psychological method for economics¹⁰⁹ and whose intellectual connections with the modern development of the demand for democratic satisfaction is well known,¹¹⁰ should also put forth a "theory of motivation" or classification of the subjective "social forces" as the prime movers to action.¹¹¹ It is perhaps not less significant that he further concludes that the egoistic forces or motives can operate legitimately only when modified, suffused, and controlled by the ethical or non-egoistic motive,¹¹² which of course is nothing more than social control in some form or other. In this view Wagner does not differ essentially from Mill and the various other socio-ethical writers who took their cue from Mill and his contemporaries.¹¹³

McDougall has professedly abandoned the metaphysical and logical methods of formulating a classification of the "social forces,"¹¹⁴ and has constructed a theory of instincts and corresponding emotions with derivative sentiments to serve as the natural or genetic basis of a social theory or social psychology.¹¹⁵ No other problem, except that of actually analyzing all the factors in the social situation, is of equal importance with determining the original equipment of social or human beings. But that McDougall has failed in doing this, that he has made his instincts predominantly out of acquired activities, can scarcely be denied; so that practically his classification is scarcely an

¹⁰⁹ Wagner, *Grundlegung der politischen Oekonomie*, 3 Aufl., I Bd., S. 15.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, S. 38 ff. Also, *Rede über die sociale Frage*.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 119.

¹¹³ For a characterization of the hedonistic economists see Gide et Rist, *Historie des doctrines économiques depuis les Physiocrates jusqu'à nos jours*, 592 ff. Of a similar type of thinking, in general, is Giddings' fourfold classification of the subjective elements of goodness as criteria for conduct of life. He says, "The ideal good is the rational happiness that is compounded of virtue and pleasure, of integrity and the continuing expansion of life [self-realization]." —*Principles of Sociology*, 407. Also S. N. Patten's theory of the evolution from a pain economy to a pleasure economy belongs to the same general type of theory. Cf. *Theory of Social Forces*.

¹¹⁴ *Introd. to Social Psychology*, 15.

¹¹⁵ A less complete classification of this type was put forth by H. R. Marshall in 1894. Cf. *Pleasure, Pain, and Aesthetics*, chap. ii.

advance upon the older subjectivistic logical classifications. All alike are subjectivistic, stopping with consciousness, real or imaginary, and covering up the real and objective sources of stimulation to activity.¹¹⁶

Thus has been traced in outline in this chapter the development of social and ethical theory from Hobbes to the present time. Hobbes started the discussion both as to the origins of activity and as to the basis of the control of that activity, in the individual and the group. It appears that the answer to the former question has not greatly varied in the dominant line of theory to the present day, though recently there is a sign of change consequent upon a better analysis of nervous activity and conscious processes. The latter problem was treated and answered in various ways by such writers as Locke, Rousseau, and others mentioned above. Through Rousseau the theory of authority or control went over into three related schools, that of the radical democracy, the modern individualistic socialism, and philosophic anarchism. The straight line of development of this idea, however, was rather through Locke, Hume, and Bentham and the latter's school of jurists, as was detailed above, with a measure of influence, however, from the various other schools, as for instance in the case of eighteenth-century French influence upon Mill. This has been the most effective and practical line of development, and hence the one to engage our attention here. This line of theory, like the others, has been uniformly subjectivistic. Until recently it was hedonistic, even among our earlier functional sociologists, such as Spencer and Ward. But even with Spencer and Ward there is a perceptible movement away from the old hedonistic criteria.¹¹⁷ Their subsidiary classifications, or the addition of other elements as secondary to the plainly hedonic, were beginnings of a movement away from both the hedonic and the otherwise subjectivistic criteria.

¹¹⁶ Cf. also Williams, "Outline of a Theory of Social Motives," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, XV, 741.

¹¹⁷ Ward is, in a sense, a reactionary in that (as pointed out above) he developed to its limits Spencer's hedonistic criterion. But his emphasis upon the social value of knowledge entitles him to a place in the transition.

It was the admission of other social forces into the classifications which had begun to appear with a further analysis of social life. Ross discounts the hedonic element and Small drops it entirely in his non-hierarchical classification, and the content becomes predominantly objective. But the application which they demand for these classifications is still primarily subjectivistic. It has been difficult in the early stages of a social science to depart from the models of the old subjectivistic and individualistic philosophy.

However, the old philosophy will not suffice for the foundations of a new functional sociology. Consequently the answers to Hobbes's two questions must be in other terms. We can no longer attribute the cause of the act or intrust the regulation of social control to the individual's consciousness primarily, but we must trace both back finally to the social and physical environment. To develop this point more fully will be the purpose of the next chapter.

V. THEORIES OF THE END OF ACTIVITY— CRITICISM

- (1) CRITICISM OF THE VIEWS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER.—(2) CHIEF OBJECTIONS TO THE HAPPINESS CRITERION.—(3) ERROR OF THE CLASSIFICATIONISTS

In the previous chapter the line of development in social and ethical theory was sketched briefly and the close connection between modern neo-utilitarian ethics and the rising functional sociology was pointed out. It was found that, while latterly the trend has been away from the hedonistic criterion of happiness, the criterion of the end of action with these theorists is still a subjective one, i.e., it makes the individual and his mental processes, his individual choice, the determinant of what his conduct shall be in a social world. The purpose of the present chapter is (1) to criticize briefly the various views discussed in some detail in the previous chapter, (2) to summarize the chief and most weighty objections to the happiness criterion, and (3) to indicate the essential error of the subjectivistic classifications which play so large a part in the theory of modern sociology.

I. Morris and Nietzsche were taken as types of the branch of social theory which subjects all forms of social control to the test of individual gratification, the latter as representative of the anarchistic view of the naturalness of society, formulated most effectively in modern times by Rousseau, and the former as representative of the more individualistic and dominant socialism, also largely traceable to the pronouncements of Rousseau. Whether happiness could be realized in the absence of control, as they assume it could, is not a primary question here. It is the task of this study to point out the anti-social implications of the happiness criterion of activity or conduct. Both the men mentioned here conceive of social control as incompatible with happiness, and happiness is their end. Morris'

assumption that remorse will of itself take care of transgression [of the happiness of others?] is naïve and is contradicted both by psychological analysis of the human instinctive and emotional equipment and by all our knowledge of ordinary life. Remorse is itself the creature of social control. Equally unjustified is his assumption that people naturally like to work, at least at things of social value.¹ His idea of education is likewise esoteric and unpractical, as was his theory of industry as a whole. Nietzsche also lacks a practical and scientific knowledge of the original or innate equipment of individuals, as is shown in particular by his use of the term "instinct," which he applies to practically any habitual tendency to activity. His account of reactive movements is metaphysical and untrue to fact in the extreme.² The evolutionary value of morality is entirely lost to him.³

The same lack of information regarding matters of human nature and social facts comes out also in connection with the happiness criterion and the nonsensical "analyse de l'attraction passionnée" of Fourier.⁴

¹ The so-called "instinct of workmanship" (cf. Veblen, "The Instinct of Workmanship and the Irsomeness of Labor," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, IV, 187), which some of our pseudo-sociological writers have made so much of, merely represents a tendency of the organism to be active. It guarantees nothing as to the object or objects of that activity. Prize-fighting, professional gambling, tramping are, from an individualistic standpoint, as effective methods of correlating these tendencies to activity as any other. To get useful social results there must be social control, and often coercive control, certainly resulting in different activity effects from those Morris considered valuable.

² He characterizes the contradiction between the psychological and his own interpretations as follows: ". . . The difference is fundamental: in the one case [that of the view attributed to the psychologists] the guarding against further injury is intended; in the other [his] the object is to *narcotise* some torturing, secret pain which grows intolerable, by means of a violent emotion of any kind, and to remove it, for the moment at least, from consciousness."—*Genealogy of Morals*, 176. Compare Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 55. This view is hopelessly sophisticated and intellectualistic and even the view which he attributes to the psychologists is more intellectualistic than the logical psychologists themselves hold.

³ He received his training in classical archaeology and the classical languages and was accordingly a *littérateur*, very much as was Rousseau.

⁴ Cf. *Nouveau monde industriel et sociétaire*, 47 ff. A typical statement of his is: "L'état sociétaire, en donnant à chaque le plus vaste développement,

Bentham, on the other hand, had a practical and relatively social end.⁵ He hoped to secure democratic satisfaction, i.e., the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and he assumed that individual happiness, which he regarded as identical with pleasure, is also social happiness. In other words, he could conceive of no social end as apart from the happiness or pleasure of individuals. He avoided the problem of the individual and social detriment of some pleasures by assuming a highly sophisticated calculation of present and future values or utilities of pleasures (all of which he regarded as being of the same quality) quite regardless of the unconscious nature of most of our activity,⁶ and of the fact that retribution does not always fall logically upon the delinquent, and further that the chief factor in playing the game of getting the maximum pleasure is one of shifting upon others the consequences of destructive activity.

Mill's introduction of the idea of quality in feeling or happiness and his substitution of the happiness of society for that of the individual as the ultimate criterion, have been generally admitted to be a practical negation of the happiness standard;⁷ because the measure of quality is ultimately social and objective, and a distinction between the happiness of the individual and that of society has meaning only when it is recognized that there is an antithesis between individual gratification and social life. The introduction of a social "instinct," or of acquired social feeling, to remove the contradiction between individual and social happiness is in itself an admission of the primary efficiency of social control over individual preference in determining activity or conduct.

The same fundamental criticism may be made of Spencer

l'essor en tous degrés est assuré d'en voir naître des gages de concorde générale, et des ralliements entre les classes les plus antipathiques, riches et pauvres, testateurs et héritiers," etc.—Ibid., 333.

⁵ Cf. introductory chapter.

⁶ Cf. reference to Thorndike, chap. iii, note 10, above.

⁷ Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, 227; Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 89; Green, *op. cit.*, 168 ff.; Martineau, *op. cit.*, II, 110; Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, 106 ff.; Rashdall, *op. cit.*, I, 36; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, 279-80.

and of the other neo-utilitarians whose views were analyzed from this standpoint in section iv of the previous chapter. Their views differ essentially only in the form of statement, which has been growing less logical and more evolutionary. Spencer assumes the biological and racial identity of the pleasurable and the useful, of the unpleasant and the harmful, an assumption which a slight experience in life negates, both in its application to the individual and to the race.⁸ Dewey makes a distinction between pleasure and happiness, which is unjustified both by common usage and by his own treatment. He also admits that the "greater" happiness will not follow from moral (social) activity, but claims that happiness from such a source is the best.⁹ He does not answer the question, "Whose best?" which would get him into difficulty. That it is not the individual's best is evidenced, first, by the fact that it is chosen as a result of some degree of social coercion or control, as a means to adjustment *to* a situation, and, second, that it is not the "greater happiness." The admission that it is society's best would be the same old implied confession that social good or survival and not individual happiness is the ultimate working criterion. The assumption by Dewey and others that the happiness of the individual is identical with that of the group, when the end of action is a social one, is based upon two other assumptions, (1) that the democratically free individual¹⁰ can know all the social values and uses of an activity, and (2) that if he did know all the social values and uses he would frequently choose to his own disadvantage (from the standpoint of feeling), since we cannot truthfully assume that the world is a perfect harmony of forces and interests, i.e., that there is no necessity for individual adjustment.¹¹ The former assumption is an impossibility; the other an improbability. Only a social organization in some degree compulsory has ever assured social welfare and survival, and it is not likely that any other can.

⁸ Cf. Sidgwick, *Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau*, 162 ff.; Marshall, *op. cit.*, 352.

⁹ Cf. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, 301.

¹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 301, 303-4.

¹¹ Cf. Lecky, *op. cit.*, 61; Stephen, *op. cit.*, 433.

This same fundamental confusion, it was seen, went over also into the theories of the early sociologists like Spencer, Ward, and their followers.

The secondary group of writers mentioned in section v of the preceding chapter were introduced for the purpose of illustrating the contention that the subjectivistic criterion is not alone limited to the setting-up of happiness as the end of activity. When such criteria as reason, conscience, harmony, self-realization, or maximum activity are used, in actual practice or living the individual must go back of these criteria and find some more ultimate criterion, in self-gratification or pleasure, conformity to custom, the will of the deity, political authority, public opinion, or finally the most complete scientific knowledge of social phenomena or processes possible. It may be a mixture of all these; but there is no assurance that it will not be the first, i.e., the individual's pleasure. When it becomes the last—as it rarely, if ever, does—it ceases to be individualistic and becomes constructively social. Among the non-hedonistic writers mentioned above, however, it was and could be only individualistic, because they had neither the conception of an objective social analysis for purposes of control, nor did they have the means for making such an analysis and for formulating a system of social control on such a basis. Thus subjectivism in any form, as a criterion, depends upon a failure to comprehend the organizing, compelling, and final nature of the life of the social process or organism—the continued and compulsory existence of the group as a social unity. This failure was also found to exist in large measure, at least on the side of theory, among the sociologists. The reason for this will be discussed more fully in section iii of this chapter and in the following chapter.

II. The main reasons why happiness or pleasure cannot be considered the legitimate or efficient end of activity, either by the individual or by groups of individuals, may be summarized as follows:

Many sources of individual and social pleasure are abnormal, i.e., hurtful individually and socially. The drink habit, prostitution, the "fashions" are striking examples of such hurtful

pleasures. Any kind of an activity, regardless of its social or individual values, may become pleasurable.¹² In some types of sexual perversion murder is essential to the completest individual satisfaction.¹³

All candid utilitarians and neo-utilitarians have fallen back upon the social or moral as the ultimate guide in life and society,¹⁴ and have failed to bridge satisfactorily the chasm between the two criteria of pleasure or happiness and the socially useful or moral.

The instincts are not social. There is no "social instinct." Instincts are inherited reactions, i.e., inherited neural connections in the lower or subcortical parts of the nervous system,¹⁵ which serve to adjust the individual to the most elementary situations in his environment. Anything so complex as a conscious social adjustment must be brought about by a *learned* reaction. Hence "instinct" cannot be used to reconcile the disagreement between the happiness and the social-morality criteria.

Sympathy is instinctive only in the sense that imitation is instinctive—that there are tendencies in all individuals with a uniform or similar neural equipment to react to the same things in much the same way, whether the stimulus is received simultaneously from an object equally disconnected from two or more persons or is received in series, i.e., is received by one through another. Such "sympathetic" or "imitative" reactions may also be acquired as habits. But the "sympathy" which takes care of a *new social situation* is a matter of reflection.¹⁶ Likewise the concept "instinctive sympathy" is inadequate to reconcile the disagreement between these conflicting criteria.

The argument that the happiness criterion is efficient if we consider sufficiently the consequences of our choices (granting that such consideration is possible) breaks down because acts

¹² Cf. chap. ii.

¹³ Cf. Krafft-Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis* (English transl., New York, 1906), 526-7.

¹⁴ Cf. chap. iv, secs. iii and iv.

¹⁵ Cf. Herrick (*Science*, XXXI, 10) on the plasticity of the cortical processes.

¹⁶ Cf. chap. iii.

are not logically retributive and because no one lives long enough to reap all the consequences of his acts. In a static society in which all the members were "charter" members with an infinite lease of life and infinite knowledge, the retributive test might be efficient.

Nor can we make the qualitative distinction effective as a guide, because the "more useful acts" or "better" happiness, individually and socially considered, are so because the present or contrasted activity, though not necessarily unpleasant, is out of social adjustment. Readjustment means the breaking-down of neural co-ordinations or internal adjustments and hence is an unpleasant process.¹⁷ All progress, individual and social, involves more or less immediate suffering to those concerned. The happy individuals and the happy groups are, to use an old saw, those whose annals are brief.

But even in a hypothetically static group the individual could not unreservedly follow the dictates of happiness or pleasure. Education, if it trains in actual and functional social adjustments, necessarily involves unpleasant internal adjustments and habit acquirements.¹⁸ There are those who claim the contrary but they have not made good their claim.

The same objection holds against the view that happiness or pleasure can guide one to socially effective functioning in a democracy. There is everywhere an objective social world to which adjustments (often unpleasant personally) must be made.

Adjustment to physical and vital conditions is the first necessity of social as well as of individual life. Mental states or conscious processes come in only as a means to these adjustments, either directly or remotely. If the conscious processes are made ends in themselves and consequently become opposed to individual and social survival-adjustments, the end becomes abnormal.¹⁹

Society as it now exists, and as it must always exist if it remains cultural, is largely based upon the self-sacrifice of the individuals to the future. Society is made possible by an accu-

¹⁷ Cf. chap. ii.

¹⁸ Cf. chap. iii.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

mulation of unconsumed utilities, and any individual who would consume all the resources available without replacing them in equal or greater amounts is regarded with disapprobation and considered a parasite or criminal.

The fact that feeling is relative to its object led Spencer to believe that "instinctive" and acquired sympathy could be made pleasurable, and hence that pleasure could be made an efficient guide to action. But social sympathy is only a method, and hence involves internal disruptions and readjustments for the sake of external adjustments, and when effective, i.e., when it leads to control of the situation in the interest of another,—when it is not wholly subjective, and thus merely the feeling accompaniment of a realized or potential reaction similar to that of the fellow socius stimulated as pointed out above—it is likely to result in the more unpleasantness and inconvenience the more experienced.

It may be urged that in an ultimate perfect state of society there will not have to be unpleasant adjustments, and that the pleasant and the socially useful activities tend to merge.²⁰ But this is presupposing an ultimate statical condition which the facts of individual and social life do not justify us in assuming. Life must always be a continual adjustment, though the more we secure a scientific control of the physical and social environment the less radical and unpleasant adjustments are likely to be.

III. When it is remembered how ideas grow up, it is not surprising that the first attempts at a functional sociology—a sociology beginning to deal with the concrete problems of social control or social functioning—should still follow after the old subjectivistic—both democratic hedonistic and ethical individualistic—writers on psychology and ethics, and thus should be in large measure classificational rather than actually functional. When Fourier made his famous and absurd classification he suffered from an almost total poverty of actual social facts. It was not till after Spencer and the ethnologists, the practical social workers, statisticians, etc., had got together a

²⁰ Cf. Meakin, *op. cit.*, chap. xxvii.

large mass of data that anything but an a priori sociology was possible. But the mere presence of facts does not solve a problem. The problem must be stated and the facts bearing on it must be focused. The very fact that the mind attacks a problem means, usually, that an adjustment to the situation is being made in a round-about way. Only familiarity with a situation makes direct action possible. The early sociologists neither understood their problem clearly, nor, as a consequence, were they able to relate their facts correctly. As a result they sought a *method*—a method which would at once state their problem and solve it. Influenced by tradition and by their own training, they began by culling from the a priori and subjectivistic conclusions of the previous psychological and ethical writers, and these cullings they made into classifications of the so-called “social forces,” with which they believed themselves able to explain all social phenomena. The origin and types of these classifications were illustrated in the preceding chapter.²¹

The constant aim of the most accurate, complete, and objective classifications of the “social forces”—and few classifications have been any of these adequately so far—is to point out: (1) how the individual acts or behaves, the organs he uses and how he uses them when stimulated in known or unknown ways, and (2) how a group acts or behaves, the types of control which are exercised over individual activities or behaviors, in known or unknown ways. In the individual these may be instinctive or acquired (habitual) behaviors; in the group they may have grown up unconsciously through custom, or they may have been consciously legislated into existence, or taken on through pressure of public opinion, or as a result of scientific investigation.

Those of the former type have been called “social forces” and traced back to the individual consciousness and lodged there

²¹ There were, of course, some early attempts at explaining social phenomena on a more or less objective basis, made by such men as Buckle and other anthropogeographers and “economic” interpretationists. But their interpretations broke down because of insufficient data as well as because of the unwarranted assumption of certain impossible mental or subjective consequences following from environmental influences.

by the subjectivistic classificationists, because the individual is usually conscious of his socially most conspicuous acts, and when he is not thus conscious, consciousness is logically inferred or assumed.²² Thus a crude sociology stops at the sacred precincts of consciousness, and there in the *forms* of consciousness ends its search for the "social forces." It is only recently that we have come to think of consciousness as other than ultimate, as caused and as merely a factor in adjustment.

With the same subjective emphasis and understanding, the social behaviors have also by analogy been called "social forces," when they were abstracted from the homogeneous social situation and were observed to be carried on through or by individuals. The distinction here was not at first clear, as appeared in the preceding chapter, where "desires" and "interests" were seen to be constantly confused in the classifications. Mere forms of activity though they are, there is more reason for terming the latter type of behaviors "social forces" than the former, because they inevitably go behind the individual consciousness to some extent and at least co-ordinate loosely the most general types of social processes or activities.

The most accurate possible classifications of the kinds instanced in the preceding chapter, if assumed to be essential at all, mark only the most elementary stage in the analysis of social phenomena, in the statement and solution of social problems. Our social sciences, as distinct from pure technologies, have so far, however, dealt chiefly with such classifications. For a long time economics was practically a logic of the hypothetical interplay of whatever subjective "forces" the theorist might feel himself inclined or compelled to recognize. Though German economists of the practical school have in large degree rescued this science from its former subjectivistic trend, English and American economic writers are as yet by no means convinced. To show that sociology and ethics have been and

²² This assumption of the conscious nature of all activities is necessary to any doctrine of thoroughgoing hedonism or subjectivism, as has been indicated earlier in this study.

are handicapped in a similar manner was the primary purpose of the preceding chapter.

As we pass from an introspective to an experimental and biological psychology, and thus come to analyze the conditions of consciousness and to see how it functions in mediating adjustments to our social and physical environments, we go back of the mere forms of consciousness in our study of social causation and control. Under such conditions, our search for "social forces" undertakes to account objectively for the functioning processes, (1) of the individual and (2) of the group. In social practice we entered this stage when we ceased treating disease on the demonistic basis or attempting to cure national ills by public prayer. But that the scientific spirit has by no means mastered us as yet is evidenced by the fact that in our criminological practice we do not ordinarily seek to reform or "cure" the offender so much as to retaliate in an unprofitable manner. Likewise our ethics is still written on this subjectivistic and retaliative basis of limiting morality to the scope of consciousness or intention.²³

The subjective "social forces" of these classificationists are only forms of consciousness by which the subject recognizes more or less efficiently the presence of personal activities, of stimuli-response processes; while their more objective "social forces" are only abstractions by which we symbolize and present to ourselves more or less perfectly the objective social processes. They are not forces; at the most they are partial indices of social "forces" or processes. Nor have they constant equivalents; for conscious processes and our statements of social processes have at different times different activity equivalents. They are qualitative rather than quantitative indices. They merely invite to always further analysis and re-analysis of the objective social situation; and it is on the basis of these analyses that all our problems are to be comprehended and effectively solved. When a situation is once adequately analyzed, when the forces lying back of the forms of

²³ Cf. Introduction.

consciousness or the abstracted and generalized types of social and individual activity, are understood, the method of the solution of the problem is simply that of the application of common sense. The only mystery there is about the treatment of social problems is that which we make by being content to stop with the forms of consciousness in our analysis. We talk about the riddle of personality as an impregnable barrier to an adequate understanding of social conditions, because we are attempting to work out a logic of forces and activities from the kaleidoscopic presentations of our conscious processes.

The problem, then, before sociologists is to push farther back the analysis of objective phenomena. Sociology cannot retain the solipsistic character of a solipsistic discipline and attain to the efficiency of a true science. As psychology retreats from its introspective analysis of the solipsistic self, and as ethics gives up mere intention as the criterion of morality, so sociology must turn from a subjectivistic classification of "social forces" and study the functioning of objective social processes as they operate in individuals and groups. It is even fitting that the "science of society" should lead the movement and make the demand upon related sciences for new materials and a new method. Already much practical work has been done among sociologists, economists, and political scientists. History, however, is still largely subjectivistic, giving its attention in the main to what is reputed to have been in the minds of certain men in certain abstracted situations.

To recapitulate, the prevailing tendency in social theory and practice almost since the time of Hobbes has been toward democratic gratification. As opposed to the view and practice which it supplanted, that of aristocratic gratification, it is an obvious improvement. But we are now beginning to see that this tendency is only a stage in social and ethical development, and that as an ideal it is inadequate for our needs. The substitute which we seek for it in turn is democratic social conservation. The question arises, How may we attain it? Obviously only by changing our measure of values from the subjectivistic individual criterion where it now rests to the

social criterion of the good and development of society as a whole, the survival and growth of the largest unified group, based upon the completest possible scientific and objective analysis of the conditions of social activity in the individual and the group. The history of the development of this conception and the exposition of the method by which it must be realized is the subject of the next chapter.

VI. THE ORGANIC OR UNITARY VIEW OF SOCIETY

DEMAND OF SOCIAL PRACTICE FOR A NEW SOCIAL THEORY.—

DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF THE SOCIAL ORGANISM.—

THEORY OF THE SOCIAL ORGANISM AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY.—DEMAND FOR OBJECTIVE SOCIAL ANALYSIS AS A

MEANS TO SOCIAL CONTROL.—THE FUNCTION OF THE ORGANIC OR UNITARY VIEW OF SOCIETY

The old subjectivistic and highly intellectualistic classifications of the social forces with their attendant implications of individualistic reference and the practical negation of objective social control have proved highly unsatisfactory. The ideal of democratic satisfaction as a sufficient criterion for social action is gradually being repudiated and another ideal of democratic conservation is steadily growing. We have seen the trend away from the purely individual and hedonic reference of the sociological classifications of Spencer and Ward, to classifications with a mainly objective reference, as in the cases of Small, Ratzenhofer, and De Greef, where chiefly the wording and minor applications betray the subjectivistic origins. But the present trend is to avoid all classifications whatever from the purely psychical or independently volitional side, and to launch out into an objective analysis of social facts as they operate in people and in groups, in order to bring these facts under control. This is a clear sign that sociology is becoming a science of definite and reasonably dependable social facts, i.e., of society, instead of an introspective mental discipline based on the solipsistic assumption of independent psychical causation.¹ Social practice has been, in the main, objective in its application and reference, and is becoming more so—a fact which has called for a social philosophy which can explain and justify current social practice. The demand for such an explanatory and communi-

¹ See, by way of contrast, Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 55, 129; Small, *op. cit.*, 435; Ross, *op. cit.*, 160-61; Judd, *op. cit.*, *Psy. Rev.*, March, 1910.

catory social theory has become imperative and is being acceded to, though somewhat reluctantly. This reluctance is due both to the deterring influence of contrary traditions and to the insufficient and poorly co-ordinated data on which to base methods of procedure.

The line of development in sociological theory which has done much toward laying an objective foundation for a theory of social control or activity has been the one commonly known, at least in its later development, as the theory of the social organism. This theory has had its main development in France. Hobbes, however, speaks of the state (society) as an immense man.² He had a conception of compulsory or organic social unity, though it was determined by his theory of political absolutism. But Comte appears to have been the first writer to have a really functional conception of the fundamental nature of the social unity. He was strongly impressed with the necessity of some means of co-ordinating or controlling social action in order to bring it to the greatest efficiency. Out of this appreciation grew his mystical and autocratic, and not at all scientific, view of humanity as an ever-growing and perfecting whole, in which the individual merges and becomes a factor in the eternal human and social process, thus, and thus only, achieving immortality.³ This view was the center of his doctrine of the religion of humanity, and aside from its mystical and emotional setting may be said to presage an important later scientific conception.⁴

Herbert Spencer, under the influence of the biological discoveries of his time, took up Comte's idea of the unity of the group or society and clothed it in a biological analogy, thus rendering it concrete if not conclusive.⁵ The French and Rus-

² *Leviathan*, Introduction.

³ Cf. "Theory of the Future of Man," *System of Positive Polity*, IV (transl. Congreve), chap. i.

⁴ Saint-Simon, like Plato, had earlier put forward a social program which involved this idea of the essential or organic unity of society, but in his mind it was primarily a political unity (cf. *L'organisateur* and *Système industriel*).

⁵ Cf. "The Social Organism," *Essays Scientific, Political, and Speculative*, I, 265 ff.

sian writers in particular were impressed by Spencer's analogy and, under the enthusiasm for its concreteness, for a while lost sight of its value as a symbol in attempting to establish the biological nature of society in detail.

Paul von Lilienfeld took as his thesis the view that society is a living organic natural product.⁶ De Greef takes a similar position, introducing, however, the idea of the "superorganism."⁷ This modifying concept of the superorganism was later somewhat more extensively developed at the expense of the biological analogy.⁸ Worms limits the term social organism much more closely than the older writers⁹ did, applying it only to nationalities, which have permanence of functioning.¹⁰ Pioger drops the analogy between man and the cell, in the organism, and compares the former in his activities, rather, to a drop of blood circulating in the body.¹¹ He does not find human society so fundamentally different from insect and animal societies, as most writers had; a much exaggerated and over-estimated intelligence being the sole distinguishing factor.¹² The present tendency among French sociologists seems to be to

⁶ "Die menschliche Gesellschaft ist, gleich den Naturorganismen, ein reales Wesen, ist nichts mehr, als eine Fortsetzung der Natur, ist nur ein höherer Ausdruck derselben Kräfte, die allen Naturerscheinungen zu Grunde liegen."—"Die Menschliche Gesellschaft als realer Organismus," in *Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaften der Zukunft*, I Vorwort.

⁷ Cf. *Introduction à la Sociologie*, II, 12 ff.

⁸ Cf. Pioger, *La vie sociale*, chap. ii.

⁹ E.g., Novicov.

¹⁰ Cf. *Organisme et société*, 31 ff.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 38.

¹² "En réalité l'homme suit sa voie dans la société dont il fait partie absolument comme la fourmi remplit son rôle dans sa fourmilière, comme l'abeille dans sa ruche: la seule différence, c'est que dans la société humaine il y a des individus qui présentent une merveilleuse adaptivité que nous appelons l'intelligence et à laquelle nous nous obstinons à attribuer exclusivement la marche de l'humanité, comme si, en réalité, nous pouvions vraiment prétendre que c'est la raison qui nous mène. . . . Il est temps d'abandonner nos illusions à ce sujet: le déterminisme ne perd pas plus ses droits en évolution sociale qu'en évolution organique ou physique. . . . Nous comprendrons ainsi combien sont illusoire nos prétentions à croire que nous faisons ou pouvons refaire la société. Pas plus que nous ne pouvons prétendre pouvoir refaire nos organes, pas plus nous ne pouvons changer la structure sociale."—*Ibid.*, 39-40.

base the theory of the compulsory or essential unity of society upon the principle of the division of labor or of social functions, an explanation destined to be of the greatest value in the future development of social science and practice.¹³

Novicov was one of the first among sociologists to see the necessity of applying the theory of evolution to social facts in the interest of a science of sociology.¹⁴ He pointed out in 1897 that the prevailing classifications based upon sex, economic, juridical, ethnic, etc., phenomena are discrete, non-exclusive, and anarchistic. At the same time he urged the organic view of society as the only substitute capable of securing unity of activity in social matters.¹⁵ He sees no hope for a science of sociology until the subjectivistic criteria can be eliminated.¹⁶ Pioger also argues against the prevailing disunity of the object of attention in sociology and social practice.¹⁷

The critics of the organic view of society, in pointing out the absurdities of the biological homologies, which even the

¹³ Durkheim, *De la division du travail social*; and Pioger, *op. cit.*, 42 ff.

¹⁴ "La théorie de l'évolution est d'abord formulée par les naturalistes, puis généralisée par les philosophes. . . . Dès lors la sociologie devient possible, et, en peu d'années, elle va acquérir une importance de premier ordre."—*La politique internationale* (Paris, 1886), 11.

¹⁵ Cf. *Conscience et volonté sociales*, 2-3. Also: "Ainsi quelle est l'utilité de l'organicisme? Elle peut se résumer ainsi: la théorie organique créera un mode de penser particulier dans la sociologie: un mode réaliste, positif. Elle nous débarrassera, une fois pour toutes, des méthodes abstraites. Au lieu de cette affirmation générale, on peut dire aussi que la théorie organique nous délivrera de l'amorphisme, de la métaphysique et du conservatisme."—"La théorie organique des sociétés," *Annales de l'Institut international de sociologie* (1898), 188.

¹⁶ "Elle [sociologie] ne pourra se constituer en science exacte que si sa généralisation dernière cesse d'être une affaire d'appréciation personnelle. Elle se constituera quand elle aura une généralisation rationnelle. . . . La porte est ouverte à l'arbitraire, à la fantaisie et à l'empirisme. Chacun arrive avec son petit système personnel et on ne voit pas pourquoi celui de Jean doit être plus mauvais que celui de Paul."—*Conscience et volonté sociales*, 9-10.

¹⁷ "C'est, en effet, une grande illusion de s'imaginer qu'on peut avoir des idées justes sur la morale, la politique, la propriété, le droit ou la justice, sans avoir besoin d'approfondir la notion même de ce qu'est une société. C'est à peu près comme les 'gens du monde' qui s'imaginent naïvement avoir des idées précises sur leur santé et leurs maladies sans avoir appris la biologie, sans se douter de leur ignorance."—*Op. cit.*, 30.

earlier writers did not generally regard as primary and which have long been practically abandoned, have neglected the essential idea and purpose of this theory. This purpose was not ever—except in certain aberrations—to prove that society is a living animal, but to prove that society is necessarily a living unity. The real contribution of the theory is that it gave an objective basis for the analysis and correlation of social phenomena in the service of social control or functioning. The subjectivistic and individualistic sociologists have objected that this view destroys freedom and individual initiative. Sociology as a science of social control, as a functional science, must doubtless work toward limiting irresponsible activity or freedom in pointing out and preventing the deleterious social effects of such activities. Lilienfeld, however, maintains that the more efficiently man is developed socially the greater his capacity for freedom becomes.¹⁸ True freedom of activity cannot be realized in irresponsibility of action or under presumably purely subjective or personal initiative, but only where all the conditions of activity are uniform and thoroughly controlled,¹⁹ where the individual is not subjected constantly to unexpected stimuli and impulsions which he cannot guard against. Where there is true freedom there must be foresight of the results of the activity, and the individual must be able to guide himself according to the laws and principles of control which a science of social phenomena makes clear to him. The essential motive of the organic theory of society, at least in its later development, has not been to reduce the freedom of individuals, except where that freedom is anti-social. At its best it has been to present a conception

¹⁸ "Der Mensch kann frei, nach seiner Willkür, so oder anders handeln, aber nicht unbedingt, sondern mehr oder weniger abhängig von den physischen, durch die Umgebung gesetzten Bedingungen. Je höher der Mensch ausgebildet ist, desto mehr erweitert sich das Gebiet der Freiheit, und desto zweckmässiger und vernünftiger werden gleichzeitig seine Handlungen."—*Op. cit.*, 348–49.

¹⁹ ". . . As a certain atmospheric pressure is essential to the proper aëration and circulation of the blood, so a certain weight of social opinion is necessary to the complete expression of the nature of the individual, that is, to the freest volitional action."—Meakin, *op. cit.*, 208.

of society, or of group life, as the necessary and compelling unity of functions. This conception, it was expected, would replace the old unscientific and subjectivistic criteria of activity with a scientific and objective criterion and would supply the individual with the necessary facts for guiding his consciously chosen activities, as well as select his activities for him when he is incapable of choosing them in a social way himself, because of either defectiveness or delinquency.

The strictly biological theory of society failed because from its very nature it could never get beyond the stage of analogy in analyzing situations. It served to illustrate the essential unity of society, but it could not describe the functionings of the social processes with sufficient accuracy to bring those activities under effective social control. This necessity for a completer analysis of social phenomena has been emphasized strongly by a number of writers and especially in this country by Lester F. Ward and Albion W. Small. To Ward belongs the honor of having emphasized first in an adequate manner the necessity for discovering the facts of human society and of making them generally known through a system of elaborate instruction.²⁰ This emphasis has justly given Professor Ward a chief place among the leading sociologists. The great defects of his work, however, are that it, like all the sociological output contemporary with it, was done from an individualistic standpoint, and that the importance and necessity for an objective criterion of social control was not appreciated. Moralists of all times have discussed the question whether knowledge of the right necessarily leads to doing the right,²¹ and the protagonists of this theme have never been able to convince the doubters. Nor can they ever do so. Activity is the result of the set of the whole nervous system (merely including the immediate stimulus)²² and not of the mere ideational processes alone. Consequently there is always likely to be more or less dissimilarity between knowledge and conduct. It is at this point that Ward's theory of the sufficiency

²⁰ Cf. *Dynamic Sociology*, II, chaps. xiii-xiv.

²¹ Cf. Plato, *Republic*, book iv.

²² Cf. chap. iii, and Woodworth, *op. cit.*

of research and instruction breaks down, as any theory of subjective control must break down. Education, though it involves a certain amount of objective social control, is not alone effective. It is, however, one of the most powerful adjuncts to social control if it is of a functional and social nature.

Professor Small, likewise, has insisted strongly upon the analysis of social phenomena as well as upon closer co-operation among the social sciences in this work. In speaking of the conditions of society, he says, "Life is an affair of adjusting ourselves to material, matter-of-fact, inexorable nature."²³ But his conception of what constitutes social analysis is not in the last analysis, seemingly, so much the discovery of the concrete facts of the working of the social processes as a kind of subjective analysis and co-ordination of real or imagined psychical processes in the individual.²⁴ He conceives of social problems as entanglements of persons with certain interests or conscious processes to be satisfied.²⁵ "Sociology accordingly involves first of all a technique for detecting, classifying, criticizing, measuring, and correlating human interests."²⁶ Professor Small's actual analysis of situations, however, is usually of the objective kind.

²³ *General Sociology*, 408. "Every social question, from electing a pope down to laying out a country road, is in the last analysis a question of what to do in the face of the grudging soil, and the cruel climate, and the narrow space, of the region from which we get our food."—*Ibid.*

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 433-34; and *Amer. Jour. of Sociology* (March, 1907), 647.

²⁵ "Social problems are entanglements of persons with persons, and each of these persons is a combination of interests developed in certain unique proportions and directions: All study of social situations must consequently be primarily a qualitative and quantitative analysis of actually observed mixtures of interests."—*General Sociology*, 436.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 437. This limitation of the problem of sociology to a study of human experience (*ibid.*, 184), thus making the object of attention for it an isolated metaphysical entity on the analogy of the psychologist's solipsistic self, instead of making it coincident with the study of human activity or functioning, has also been shared by others. Cf. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Introd.; Tarde, *Laws of Imitation* (transl. Parsons), 3: "Socially, everything is either invention or imitation"; Davis, *Psychological Interpretation of Society*, 199; etc.

The more fruitful tendency among sociologists, the line of activity which is making good the failure or omission of the organic analogists, has been in connection with the concrete analysis of social conditions. For a long while the ethnologists and anthropologists had a predominating influence in the development of sociology. Both Spencer and Letourneau wrote their sociologies from this standpoint, and the more recent works of Westermarck and Hobhouse in the field of social ethics have largely followed this lead. But, besides the relative simplicity and non-cultural nature of primitive society, there are numerous other limitations to this method which have prevented it from being generally adopted. Of more importance is the actual analysis of present-day social conditions, such as has been undertaken by the host of writers on the structure and functioning of particular contemporary groups and institutions. And most important of all are the various more or less technical studies in social psychology, anthropogeography, immigration, of the labor question, of housing conditions and reform, in vital statistics, in public education, in criminology, philanthropy, etc. It is from the direct and co-ordinated application of these facts to human conditions, and not from logical classifications of real or pseudo-mental processes or "social forces," nor from working over the solipsistic categories of a subjectivistic psychology and ethics, that a valid sociology and social practice must be built up.

Much, however, of this objective analysis of social phenomena has been unsatisfactory. The findings of the investigator with a bias are always open to suspicion, and time is always necessary to the verification and testing of facts. An intelligible analysis and scientific evaluation of social phenomena cannot be made without constantly keeping in mind two things, (1) the perspective of social development, and (2) the unitary nature of society. Most errors in the analysis of social conditions, as well as in prescriptions for social ills, are due to disregard for one or both of these principles. The two principles are themselves closely related, the idea of the unitary nature of society depending upon a perspective of social development, just

as the idea of the unity of species comes only with the idea of evolution.

While we must reject the theory of the biological nature of society, it is necessary, however, to recognize its fundamental contribution—the emphasis upon the unitary character of society and its sanction of objective analysis and control. Man's biological evolution, notably in connection with prolonged infancy, makes a social organization necessary to his existence. All institutional and cultural life is essentially based upon such organization and often upon the strictest social control. The plea to live according to nature or to conform our social institutions to "natural" laws has no meaning, unless we wish not only to undertake a difficult or impossible return to a non-cultural animal existence, but also to undergo reversion in our individual physiological and organic constitutions. The social problem is not the elimination of the artificial from social life, but its control, its subordination to the service of social ends and activities. Such a control can be obtained only on the basis of a scientific analysis of social phenomena. The analysis of the individual is only one of the phases of such analysis, while the analysis of conscious processes and wants or interests as "social forces" is only a still further subdivision of the analysis of the individual, and is co-ordinate with the analysis of his habits, instincts, physiological structures, digestive capacity, etc.²⁷ The problem of social analysis and of the determination of the "social forces" is a much more complex, and also a much more fruitful, task than the subjectivistic sociologists have appreciated. Only by replacing and supplementing analogy and subjective classification with concrete social facts can we hope to have a true science of society, or sociology.

²⁷ Subjective factors, however, cannot be disregarded; for the character of the social process depends in large measure upon the mental attitudes of individuals and, with the development of a more adequate and scientific social control, will depend in an increasing degree upon these attitudes. Therefore the psychic factors must be analyzed—not as independent phenomena but always with reference to the fact that they are relatively modifiable incidents of the general objective social process and with the purpose of utilizing them in the service of a broader social control.

The farther such an analysis proceeds, that is, the more we are able to go beyond the naïve conception of mere states of consciousness as the sole or only worthy content of social life and to abstract away from this consciousness social facts and processes with objective reference and connection, just so much the more we have a science of society. The less the reference is to persons conceived as mental processes, as organisms existing for hedonic or egoistic satisfactions, and the more the reference is to the society as a functioning group of persons in activity, the more the measure of social values ceases to be the individual and becomes the satisfactory functioning of the most efficient group of which he is a member. The more such a view grows the less is the attention upon self-satisfaction, i.e., upon the production of adjustments guided by relative feeling values, and the more it is upon providing a controlled and relatively constant environment for social life and activity. Under such a condition the emphasis necessarily ceases to be upon democratic gratification and falls upon democratic conservation. Likewise the social organization becomes in a sense compulsory, for only where there is relatively complete co-ordination of activities based upon scientific analysis of social phenomena can an effectively constant environment be maintained. But the basis of this control, which is coercive where necessary upon certain refractory members of the group, is not merely custom, individual whim, or the "tyranny of public opinion," but the findings of science, i.e., the analysis of social phenomena.²⁸ The rapidity with which such a compulsory social control can be established depends upon the rapidity with which an objective social analysis proceeds. The conception of the unitary and organic nature of society can be of great service in furthering such an analysis, because it provides a new and effective standard for co-ordinating facts and for directing research.

²⁸ Cf. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 325.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

I. The chief conclusions which have been formulated or implied in the foregoing discussion may be restated as follows.

It appears that the prevailing type of sociology, especially that which has developed in America and England, is a part of the general movement for democratic gratification which had its greatest vogue in the nineteenth and the second half of the eighteenth centuries. It, however, is the particular outgrowth of the less radical wing of that movement, known as utilitarianism, and it developed under the influence of a growing analysis of social phenomena, especially in the field of ethnology. This sociology, like the preceding and contemporary utilitarianism and neo-utilitarianism in ethics, has been and is prevailingly subjectivistic and individualistic both in content and in form. The other wings of the general democratic movement are those of anarchism and hedonistic socialism, which have in various ways affected sociology but which, under the influence of an increasing objective analysis of social phenomena, are now passing out of vogue in their extreme forms. The other types of sociology of importance are those represented by the biological and organic views of society and by the "practical" sociologists—those who aim at a concrete and objective analysis of social phenomena for the sake of social control in some particular field of social activity.

Through the whole range of the development of social theory so far there appears to have been a more or less constant movement toward an objective statement of social problems. Hobbes's philosophy was a protest against the subjective and noumenal character of Scholasticism. Locke pointed out, in his own terminology, the relativity of subjective presentations or criteria. Bentham's professed and real purpose was to obtain a constant and scientific experimental basis for regulating morals and legislation, under which regulation every one should be

equal in privileges. At his time whatever unitary nature was attributed to society was thought of as imposed from without, by divinity, sovereign, or popular institution, and not as springing from the internal conditions of human social life. Consequently, he did not undertake an objective social analysis, but attempted a subjective analysis of feeling consciousness, and upon this analysis he based his social theory and policy. That his classification was not adequate to the purpose is, in the light of what has been said above, to be expected. His followers, Mill, Spencer, the social or neo-utilitarian ethicists, and the early sociologists have constantly extended the analysis and have modified the criterion, till at last its hedonistic character is largely destroyed or disguised, though its subjectivism remains.

It has been extremely difficult for even the later ethicists and sociologists, with their subjectivistic philosophic bias, to arrive at the idea that society is a self-existent, an organic and self-perpetuating unity,¹ that it is not the creature of deities, sovereigns, parliaments, public opinion, acting as genuine or quasi-independent entities, but that it as a unity creates these as incidents and forms of its existence. Likewise they have not readily grasped the fact that an adequate social analysis must be primarily an analysis of this social unity, rather than of the variable and indefinite phenomena "mind" and "feeling," which are merely phenomena and forms of the greater social whole.

Human society is not merely isolated psychical phenomena, as the subjectivistic and solipsistic sociologists appear to have thought. It is not primarily interaction of mind with mind, but co-ordinated adjustment or coadaptation of men to physical, biological, and social environment, in which mental phenomena play their part and no more. The analysis of mental phenomena in isolation cannot serve as a practical working basis for social practice and control.

Objective social analysis is being made in some fields more rapidly than it is being incorporated in a general theory of social action and control.

¹ Sumner has come closest to this idea in America, although he has been hindered by certain individualistic preconceptions. Cf. *Folkways*.

The theorists of the social organism gave form to the organic or unitary view of society—basing the theory finally upon the necessity of a division and specialization of functions among the members of the group in order to meet the increasing demands of population upon food supply—and they sanctioned in theory the demand of social practice for objective analysis. They provided a social criterion based upon the relatively permanent needs of society instead of upon the changeable wants, interests, or feelings of the individual.

Only a unitary or organic view of society—devoid, of course, of the biological homologies and analogies, which have previously been merely incidental to it in a naïve stage of development—can furnish an adequate basis for analysis of social phenomena and for the communication and application of the findings of this social analysis. So long as the individual is regarded as the measure of social values or is regarded as one of two poles, of which society is considered the other antagonistic pole, there can be no effective and convincing argument for social conformity and co-operation.

Subjectivistic sociology, ethics, and psychology have contrived to perpetuate the pre-evolutionary conception of man as a being of a different order from the animal world. A functional sociology must drop this fiction and study man as essentially a product of the physical, biological, and social conditions in which he functions. Man's superior mental equipment must undoubtedly be regarded as a superior means of adjustment, on the basis of varied co-ordinated functioning, but not as a legitimate means to anarchistic self-gratification.

It appears that the possession of knowledge is not a sufficient preparation for adequate social functioning. The *idea* is not compulsory, because it is not representative of the total equipment for action. Hence, social control cannot be individually determined, but must proceed from a controlled environment which provides the individual with a uniform and constant source of stimuli.

Social control, moreover, cannot be based upon a subjectivistic criterion, because the individual cannot know the whole social

process, i.e., foresee all possible stimuli; also because feeling is wholly relative to the objective circumstance producing it and is not efficient individually or socially as a criterion of choice. Feeling can easily be regulated socially through the control of habit formations, and thus pleasant feeling may be made to correspond to any useful social activity which is supported by public opinion and organized society.]

Society regarded as an organism or essential unity must be considered as in some degree compulsory and coercive,² but only in the sense in which the social organization controls the physical, biological, and social environment in which the individual functions. This control, to be adequate, must be on the basis of the completest possible scientific analysis of social phenomena, and must be exercised by a democratic or by some other flexible control. The compulsion or coercion which the group normally employs is justified on the ground that the social organization selects the better activity, socially considered, when the individual will not or cannot. If the social analysis is unreliable or if the administration of control is open to question, there will be a constant reference back from the group to the individual, as the center of social values, which will result in a more adequate analysis and control socially.

As a matter of fact, group control with coercion has always

²The terms compulsion or coercion are made to refer, in this study, to any method or means by which society, as the greater functioning unity, secures conformity and co-operation, either of a conscious or unconscious sort, in carrying on the organic or unified social process. If a highly conscious system of social education is found feasible and if it operates more effectively than the harsh and milder forms of autocratic and traditional control—as doubtless it would under a system of scientific social control—it will gradually supplant the other forms. In fact, it is not conceivable that efficient and permanent social control or adjustment can be attained through education, except on the basis of a scientific and objective analysis of social phenomena or processes. The primary purpose of education, even, is to provide for the developing socius those stimuli to thought and action which are deemed most valuable in shaping his character. Education becomes thereby a method of social control which is always in some degree compulsory and coercive. The important thing, in this as in other forms of control, is to preserve, by whatever means necessary, the unity and apportionment of social functions and thus to preserve the cultural gains of civilization. The contention here is that the method will be more effective if scientifically determined.

been the prevailing form of social control. Such controls have variously been based upon mythological, theological, and metaphysical categories, and sooner or later they have always broken down, because they were not based on an adequate social analysis.

A complete scientific social control cannot be expected to become operative at once, of course, but where a social fact is established it should become as obligatory as the laws of astronomy or physics. The wilful disregard of the laws of health, of social hygiene, of public morality, should have as little tolerance as a wilful disregard of the law of falling bodies when the operation of this law has social consequences of equal importance.

The social organization, or the group, is the social object of primary importance, while the individual is secondary, constitutive, and contributory. Society is relatively constant, while the individual is relatively modifiable.³ In fact, man with his intelligence, language, arts, is the product of group life, of the necessity for co-ordinate adjustment to environment to a much greater extent than the group is the product of inherent psychic characteristics of people. Even animal life is largely group life.

With such an objective and scientific basis of social control replacing the old subjective criteria of activity, we may look for a policy of democratic conservation instead of one of democratic gratification, for an ideal of social service in the place of a reign of hedonism.

II. Some of the more important implications of this organic or unitary view of society need to be mentioned briefly.

Such a view does not imply the rule of an élite in any objectionable sense. So far, all groups which have survived have been controlled either by an autocrat or by an élite. The medicine men, the patriarchs, the old men, chiefs, tyrants, kings, oli-

³ Robert Owen expressed this idea, possibly in somewhat extreme form, a century ago: "The character of man is, without a single exception, always formed for him; . . . it may be, and is chiefly, created by his predecessors; . . . they give him, or may give him, his ideas and habits, which are the powers that govern and direct his conduct. Man, therefore, never did, nor is it possible he ever can, form his own character."—*A New View of Society* (3d ed.), 91-92. See also, Spencer, *Social Statics*, 35. This idea is coming to be basic in scientific social technology.

garchies, popular assemblies composed of demagogues and politicians, at different stages of development and in different places, have always ruled. There has never been, and it is not conceivable that there ever will be, a pure democracy of very considerable proportions, in which every man is equally free and capable in forming his opinions and in expressing his activities. Experience is leading us in the United States toward the adoption of the policy of centralized administration by experts, who are made directly responsible to the people. Every social organization must be coercive to the extent necessary for efficiency or it must break down. A social organization based upon a scientific analysis and control of social phenomena in the broadest sense involves the rule of an élite in no greater degree than is implied in the responsible direction of administrative details by experts, instead of more or less irresponsible control and exploitation by professional politicians. If we could conceive of a society in which all the individuals were equally informed on all social matters and all absolutely sincere, all traces of an élite composed of experts, of aristocrats, or of professional politicians would disappear. But that is an impossibility.

Nor does such a view of society deny the necessity for social change or fail to make provision for it. On the contrary, it prescribes the condition for such change, demanding that all adjustments of individuals to the group shall be made on the basis of a scientific analysis and evaluation of social phenomena, so far as such knowledge is available; and it further makes it obligatory upon the individual to discover such knowledge where it is possible for him to do so. But since the individual cannot discover all the needed facts for himself, it recognizes the necessity for having these facts brought to the attention of the individual by the social organization, which must also demand social conformity. Those activities not under a scientific social control and which need adjustment, should be readjusted so far as possible on the basis of scientifically determined knowledge of social facts, which it is the business of the social organization to supply and enforce through whatever agencies are most effective—education, investigation, expert service, etc. The

main emphasis of this view of society is upon the abolition of whimsical, subjectivistic, hedonistic, and thus predominantly anti-social, adjustments and maladjustments, through insistence upon scientific social adjustments so far as a science of society can provide the facts.

Thus the social organism or organization, intelligently considered, establishes its importance, first, as a means for stimulating analysis and co-ordination of social phenomena for guidance in social control, and, second, as the means to the dissemination and enforcement of the findings of such investigations. At the present time we have no adequate machinery for the investigation of such facts on a large scale and our sociology, because of its largely subjectivistic reference and emphasis, is almost entirely impotent to direct such investigation.

Any compulsory organization not supplied with all the facts necessary to a scientific social control must necessarily make mistakes, as all social organizations so far have. Useful activities are liable to be interdicted and harmful ones to be encouraged. The difficulty, however, rests not with control itself when conscientiously administered but with an inadequate social science. The ever-present problem of social science is to discover what adjustments will be most effective in securing social development and the survival of the group and of the individual.⁴

Perhaps the chief advantage of the frank recognition of the inherently compulsory nature of the social unity as here explained, is that it assists in centering the attention upon the organic nature or connectedness of social problems, i.e., of cases of maladjustment. It promotes analysis and leads to the relating of problems to one another, in that it demands a co-ordination of knowledge about the problem with a view to group survival. Under such a grouping, sociology and

⁴ To guard against a possible misunderstanding, it seems necessary to say that group or social survival must also include the survival of all those individuals who are capable of social service. It is almost axiomatic that the group must be so constituted as to provide the utmost possible opportunity for the training of individuals in social functions and to utilize their capacities when so trained.

social policy cease to be confusions of apparently more or less unrelated problems, many of which conflict in their solutions. With all minor social or personal problems thus understood as converging in one large and conclusive problem of group survival and growth, each particular problem becomes an attempt to co-ordinate all the activities, thus working toward the abolition of social waste.

The group which is regarded as the object of attention will always be the most inclusive group which can be made to function as a unity. Hitherto it has been the ambition of most great religions, and of many empires, to treat the world as a whole as such a unity. All have failed. With the breaking down of magical, mythological, theological, and metaphysical controls, and with the gradual substitution of an adequate scientific social control, with adequate provision for necessary and scientific change, an adequate world control may be expected.

A truly scientific control, however, of any group, large or small, cannot be attained till all science and sciences recognize the fundamental problem of social growth and survival. The problems of all the sciences must converge about this one primary pragmatic and functional problem, and their energies must be directed, not by individual whim and interest, but by the demands of the social organism. When such co-ordination of scientific investigation is attained all science from astronomy to sociology will be, for the first time, truly functional and social in its application.

The final and supreme implication of this view of society is that when a fact is discovered it shall be applied and enforced. The counter plea of "interference with individual liberty" should have no weight in court, for individuals have no liberties in opposition to a scientifically controlled society but find all their legitimate freedom in conformity to and furtherance of such social functioning. Society is not yet regarded as a compulsory unity for much more than the suppression of rebellion, the repulsion of foreign invasion, the punishment of personal (not political) robbery, and the discouragement of

personal violence. Proper scientific analysis of social phenomena will disclose other less obvious but even more pressing problems, as indeed it has already disclosed them. As these are abstracted from the incoherent mass of social phenomena the compulsory or functional unity of society also comes into view and means must be found for the coercion of individuals who stand in the way of efficient social functioning. The chief opposition to such effective social control comes from the old subjectivistic, individualistic, and hedonic dogma of *personal liberty* and the co-ordinate term *self-realization* which are mainly pleas for personal license in more attractive forms.

Thus the advancement of civilization appears to be marked by the growth of the conception of the compulsory and inherent functional unity of society, both for the purpose of furthering a scientific analysis of social phenomena and for enforcing the findings of that analysis. The working-out of such a theory in its details, as a means of communicating ideas and information concerning the character of social activities and as a means of correlating and controlling these activities, is largely yet to be accomplished. In fact, it can be consummated only as the actual concrete social processes are analyzed and evaluated.

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